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Discovery Under 28 U.S.C. §1782:
Distinguishing International Commercial Arbitration and
International Investment Arbitration
S.I. Strong*
For many years, courts, commentators and counsel agreed that 28 U.S.C. §1782 – a somewhat
extraordinary procedural device that allows U.S. courts to order discovery in the United States
“for use in a proceeding in a foreign or international tribunal” – did not apply to disputes
involving international arbitration. However, that presumption has come under challenge in
recent years, particularly in the realm of investment arbitration, where the Chevron-Ecuador
dispute has made Section 1782 requests a commonplace procedure. This Article takes a rigorous
look at both the history and the future of Section 1782 in international arbitration, taking care to
distinguish between requests made in the context of international commercial arbitration and
requests made in the context of international investment arbitration. In so doing, the Article
considers issues relating to grants of jurisdiction, state interests and standard interpretive canons.
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I.

Introduction

One of the more compelling legal dramas to arise in recent history involves the ongoing dispute
between Chevron, Ecuador and various indigenous peoples who lived in or near certain oil fields
developed by Texaco Petroleum in the Amazon rainforest in the 1960s and 1970s.1 Not only has
the matter appeared in U.S. courts on various occasions over the last twenty years,2 it has also
generated a US$18 billion judgment in the Ecuadorian national courts.3 That judgment, which is

* Ph.D. (law), University of Cambridge (U.K.); D.Phil., University of Oxford (U.K.); J.D., Duke
University; M.P.W., University of Southern California; B.A., University of California, Davis. The
author, who is admitted to practice as an attorney in New York and Illinois and as a solicitor in England
and Wales, is Associate Professor of Law at the University of Missouri and Senior Fellow at the Center
for the Study of Dispute Resolution. The author would like to thank the participants at the Lessons From
Chevron symposium at Stanford University Law School for comments on an early draft of this paper. All
errors remain the author’s own.
1

See Theodore J. Boutrous, Jr., Ten Lessons From the Chevron Litigation: The Defense Perspective, 1
STAN. J. COMPLEX LITIG. __ (2013); Karen Halverson Cross, Converging Trends in Investment Treaty
Practice, 38 N.C. J. INT’L L. & COM. REG. 151 (2012); Michael D. Goldhaber, The Rise of Arbitral Power
Over Domestic Courts, 1 STAN. J. COMPLEX LITIG. __ (2013); Manuel A. Gómez, The Global Chase:
Seeking the Recognition and Enforcement of the Lago Agrio Judgment Outside Ecuador, 1 STAN. J.
COMPLEX LITIG. __ (2013); Judith Kimberling, Lessons From the Chevron Ecuador Litigation: The
Proposed Intervenors’ Perspective, 1 STAN. J. COMPLEX LITIG. __ (2013); Judith Kimerling, Oil,
Contact, and Conservation in the Amazon: Indigenous Huaorani, Chevron, and Yasuni, 24 COLO. J.
INT’L ENVY’S. L. & POL’Y 43 (2013) [hereinafter Kimerling, Oil]; Burt Neuborne, A Plague on Both
Their Houses: A Modest Proposal for Ending the Ecuadorian Rainforest Wars, 1 STAN. J. COMPLEX
LITIG. __ (2013); Robert V. Percival, Global Law and the Environment, 86 WASH. L. REV. 579 (2011);
Christopher A. Whytock, Some Cautionary Notes on the “Chevronization” of Transnational Litigation, 1
STAN. J. COMPLEX LITIG. __ (2013); see also Businessweek, Chevron-Ecuador Fight Comes to Canada
(May 31, 2012), available at http://www.businessweek.com/articles/2012-05-31/chevron-ecuador-fightcomes-to-canada; Reuters, Chevron’s Ecuador Pollution Arbitration to Stretch Into 2014 (Aug. 2, 2012),
available at http://www.reuters.com/article/2012/08/02/us-chevron-ecuador-idUSBRE8711C120120802.
2
The Ecuadorian plaintiffs twice attempted to bring a case on the merits in the United States, but the
actions were dismissed for forum non conveniens. See Aguinda v. Texaco, Inc., 303 F.3d 470, 480 (2d
Cir. 2002); Sequihua v. Texaco, Inc. 847 F. Supp. 61, 65 (S.D. Tex. 1994); Kimerling, Oil, supra note 1,
at 63, 71.
3
See Cause No. 2011-0106 (Jan. 3, 2012), available at http://tinyurl.com/ant37.du; Roger P. Alford,
Ancillary Discovery to Prove Denial of Justice, 53 VA. J. INT’L L. 127, 133, 147 (2012).
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now final, has been subject to enforcement actions in several countries where Chevron has
assets, including Argentina, Brazil and Canada.4
The parties have not limited themselves to judicial fora. Several different arbitral actions
have also been pursued, including an international commercial arbitration that was to be heard in
New York under the rules of the American Arbitration Association (AAA)5 and two unrelated
investment arbitrations administered by the Permanent Court of Arbitration (PCA) pursuant to
the bilateral investment treaty (BIT) between Ecuador and the United States.6 The second of the
investment arbitrations is still in progress and focuses on whether Ecuador violated the BIT by
allowing an allegedly corrupt judicial proceeding to proceed in the Ecuadorian courts, thereby
constituting a denial of justice for Chevron.7
This second BIT arbitration is remarkable in several ways. First, the tribunal has made
the somewhat unusual decision to render an interim award ordering the Republic of Ecuador to
4

Similar actions may also be brought in a number of other jurisdictions. See Alford, supra note 3, at 147
(noting the Ecuadorian plaintiffs have identified twenty-seven countries where Chevron has assets).
5
This arbitration was permanently stayed on the grounds that Ecuador was “not a party to or otherwise
contractually bound by the agreement” containing the arbitration clause. In re Chevron Corp., 762 F.
Supp. 2d 242, 247 (D. Mass. 2010) (noting the AAA arbitration was brought by Chevron against
Ecuador’s state-owned oil company, PetroEcuador); see also Republic of Ecuador v. ChevronTexaco
Corp., 499 F. Supp. 452 (S.D.N.Y. 2007), aff’d, 296 Fed. App’x 124 (2d Cir. 2008).
6
See Treaty Concerning the Encouragement and Reciprocal Protection of Investment, U.S.-Ecuador,
Aug. 27, 1993, S. TREATY DOC. NO. 103-15 (1993) (entered into force May 11, 1997) [hereinafter U.S.Ecuador BIT], available at http://www.state.gov/documents/organization/43558.pdf; In re Chevron
Corp., 762 F. Supp. 2d at 247 (noting Chevron filed the first BIT arbitration against Ecuador in December
2006, “alleging that it had been ‘denied justice’ by the Ecuadorian judiciary through long delays in the
resolution of certain contract disputes unrelated to the Lago Agrio Litigation” and that Chevron filed the
second BIT arbitration in September 2009 claiming that Ecuador “had violated the BIT by ‘allowing’ the
Lago Agrio Litigation to proceed”); Republic of Ecuador v. ChevronTexaco Corp., 499 F. Supp. 452
(S.D.N.Y. 2007), aff’d, 296 Fed. App’x 124 (2d Cir. 2008); Chevron Corp. v. The Republic of Ecuador,
PCA Case 2009-23 [hereinafter 2009 Chevron-Ecuador Arbitration] (currently ongoing), available at
http://www.pca-cpa.org/showpage.asp?pag_id=1029; Chevron Corp. v. The Republic of Ecuador, PCA
Case 2007-2 (concluded in 2011), available at http://www.pca-cpa.org/showpage.asp?pag_id=1029.
7
See Republic of Ecuador v. ChevronTexaco Corp., 499 F. Supp. 452 (S.D.N.Y. 2007), aff’d, 296 Fed.
App’x 124 (2d Cir. 2008); Alford, supra note 3, at 137; see also CAMPBELL MCLACHLAN ET AL.,
INTERNATIONAL INVESTMENT ARBITRATION: SUBSTANTIVE PRINCIPLES ¶¶7.80-7.98 (2008) (discussing
denial of justice under investment law); JAN PAULSSON, DENIAL OF JUSTICE IN INTERNATIONAL LAW
(2005) (same).
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prevent enforcement or recognition of the US$18 billion Ecuadorian court judgment either
within or without Ecuador.8 The legal community will doubtless debate the propriety of the
arbitrators’ actions in the months and years to come.9 However, the second and perhaps more
noteworthy issue, at least for purposes of this Article, relates to the fact that most of the evidence
used to support the claimant’s allegations was generated through requests made for discovery
under 28 U.S.C. §1782.10
Section 1782 is a somewhat unusual statute, in that it authorizes U.S. courts to order a
person who is resident or found in the United States to provide information or documents “for
use in a proceeding in a foreign or international tribunal.”11 While it is undisputed that Section
1782 may be used in cases involving litigation in a foreign court, numerous questions exist as to
8

See Chevron Corp. v. Republic of Ecuador, PCA Case No. 2009-23, Second Interim Award on Interim
Measures dated 16 Feb. 2012, ¶3(i), available at
http://www.chevron.com/documents/pdf/ecuador/SecondTribunalInterimAward.pdf. The form of the
order is somewhat similar to that of a U.S.-style anti-suit injunction, in that it forbids one of the parties
that is subject to the jurisdiction of the tribunal to take certain actions in other fora on at least an interim
basis, on the grounds that there is both a “risk that substantial harm may befall the Claimants before this
Tribunal can decide the Parties’ dispute by any final award” as well as “a sufficient likelihood that such
harm to the Claimants may be irreparable in the form of monetary compensation payable by the
Respondent in the event that the Claimants’ case on jurisdiction, admissibility and the merits should
prevail before this Tribunal.” Id. ¶2. Interestingly, the District Court for the Southern District of New
York had at one point also granted a “worldwide preliminary injunction barring the Ecuadorian plaintiffs
from enforcing the Lago Agrio judgment,” although that injunction was later overturned. In re Chevron
Corp., 650 F.3d 276, 282 (3d Cir. 2011) (citing Chevron Corp. v. Donziger, 768 F. Supp. 2d 581
(S.D.N.Y. 2011)), vacated by Chevron Corp. v. Naranjo, No. 11-1150-CV L, 2011 WL 4375022 (2d Cir.
Sept. 19, 2011), decision reversed and remanded by Chevron Corp. v. Naranjo, 667 F.3d 232, 234 (2d
Cir. 2012).
9
Although U.S. courts have cautioned against the use of international anti-suit injunctions on the grounds
that they interfere with the sovereignty of foreign nations and thus run the risk of offending international
comity, commentators have suggested that such injunctions are considered less problematic in cases
involving interdictory actions, since those types of anti-suit injunctions preserve the jurisdiction of the
court to hear the merits of the dispute. See Walter W. Heiser, Using Anti-Suit Injunctions to Prevent
Interdictory Actions and to Enforce Choice of Court Agreements, 2011 UTAH L. REV. 855, 861 (2011).
While the situation in the Chevron-Ecuador arbitration is not entirely analogous to anti-suit injunctions
involving interdictory actions, the issue bears further analysis, although such discussions are beyond the
scope of the current Article. See S.I. Strong, Border Skirmishes: The Intersection Between Litigation and
International Commercial Arbitration, 2012 J. DISP. RESOL. 1, 12-18 [hereinafter Strong, Borders]
(discussing the propriety of anti-suit injunctions in arbitration).
10
See 28 U.S.C. §1782 (2013); In re Chevron, 650 F.3d at 282 n.7.
11
28 U.S.C. §1782(a); see also Alford, supra note 3, at 155.
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whether and to what extent the statute could or should be used in situations involving
international arbitration.12
Although the relationship between Section 1782 and arbitration may be in many ways
unclear, that did not stop the parties involved in the Chevron-Ecuador dispute from filing Section
1782 requests in unprecedented numbers.13 In fact, matters relating to the Chevron-Ecuador
dispute now constitute a significant proportion of the jurisprudence concerning Section 1782.14
If a single hard case can make bad law, then a multitude of decisions rendered in quick
succession and relating to the same difficult legal and factual scenario can be disastrous for the
development of a particular legal proposition. As it turns out, the complex factual and
procedural posture of the Chevron-Ecuador dispute has allowed courts to avoid difficult
questions regarding the scope of 28 U.S.C. §1782 while nevertheless setting potentially
problematic precedent.15 As a result, it is well past time to analyze the jurisprudential propriety
of Section 1782 in the context of international arbitration.16 Since the parties to the ChevronEcuador dispute only started making a significant number of requests under Section 1782 in
2010, there is still time for courts to reverse what may be an ill-advised jurisprudential course.17
Although a number of commentators have considered the nuances of Section 1782 in the
context of international arbitration, very few detailed analysis have been conducted in the wake

12

See infra notes 156-438 and accompanying text.
Alford, supra note 3, at 128 (noting there are now “at least fifty orders and opinions from federal courts
across the country” relating to Section 1782 requests in the context of the Chevron-Ecuador dispute); see
also 28 U.S.C. §1782; In re Chevron Corp., 762 F. Supp. 2d 242, 244 (D. Mass. 2010); Alford, supra note
3, at 155.
14
See 28 U.S.C. §1782; Alford, supra note 3, at 155.
15
See 28 U.S.C. §1782.
16
See id.
17
See id.; see infra note 58.
13
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of the Chevron-Ecuador dispute.18 This Article attempts to fill this gap in the literature by
providing a reasoned analysis of Section 1782 requests in the context of international investment
arbitration (also referred to as “public,” “treaty-based” or “investor-state” arbitration), which is
the type of arbitral proceeding currently at issue in the Chevron-Ecuador dispute.19 However,
this Article also addresses Section 1782 requests in the context of international commercial
arbitration (also referred to as “private” or “contract-based” arbitration), since the two
procedures are occasionally confused for one another, despite several key differences.20

18

See 28 U.S.C. §1782; AAA, Federal Appeals Court Finds a Private Arbitral Tribunal Qualifies Under
§1782, 67 DISP. RESOL. J. 10, 10 (Aug.-Oct. 2012); Alford, supra note 3, at 127; Kenneth Beale et al.,
Solving the §1782 Puzzle: Bringing Certainty to the Debate Over 28 U.S.C. §1782’s Application to
International Arbitration, 47 STAN. J. INT’L L. 51, 56-98 (2011); Oekzie Chukwumerije, International
Judicial Assistance: Revitalizing Section 1782, 37 GEO. WASH. INT’L L. REV. 649, 654-60 (2005); Anna
Conley, A New World of Discovery: The Ramifications of Two Recent Federal Courts’ Decisions
Granting Judicial Assistance to Arbitral Tribunals Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §1782, 17 AM. REV. INT’L ARB.
45, 46 (2006); Paul R. Dubinsky, Is Transnational Litigation a Distinct Field? The Persistence of
Exceptionalism in American Procedural Law, 44 STAN. J. INT’L L. 301, 334-41 (2008); John Fellas,
Using Section 1782 in International Arbitration, 23 ARB. INT’L 379, 385-99 (2007); Gustavo J. Lamelas,
The Evolving Standards for Extending US Discovery Assistance to International Arbitrations, 16 IBA
ARB. NEWS 154, 154-56 (Mar. 2011); Pedro J. Martinez-Fraga, The Future of 28 U.S.C. §1782: The
Continued Advance of American-Style Discovery in International Commercial Arbitration, 64 U. MIAMI
L. REV. 89, 90-93 (2009); Marat A. Massen, Discovery for Foreign Proceedings After Intel v. Advanced
Micro Devices: A Critical Analysis of 28 U.S.C. §1782 Jurisprudence, 83 S. CAL. L. REV. 875 (2010);
Lawrence W. Newman & Rafael Castilla, Production of Evidence Through U.S. Courts for Use in
International Arbitration, 9 J. INT’L ARB. 61, 69 (1992); Alan Scott Rau, Evidence and Discovery in
American Arbitration: The Problem of “Third Parties,” 19 AM. REV. INT’L ARB. 1, 28-39 (2008)
[hereinafter Rau, Third Parties]; Daniel J. Rothstein, A Proposal to Clarify U.S. Law on Judicial
Assistance in Taking Evidence for International Arbitration, 19 AM. REV. INT’L ARB. 61, 68-79 (2008);
Peter B. Rutledge, Discovery, Judicial Assistance and Arbitration: A New Tool for Cases Involving U.S.
Entities?, 25 J. INT’L ARB. 171 (2008) [hereinafter Rutledge, Discovery]; Hans Smit, American Judicial
Assistance to International Arbitral Tribunals, 8 AM. REV. INT’L ARB. 153, 153-61 (1997) [hereinafter
Smit, Judicial Assistance]; Hans Smit, The Supreme Court Rules on the Proper Interpretation of Section
1782: Its Potential Significance for International Arbitration, 14 AM. REV. INT’L ARB. 295, 296-332
(2003) [hereinafter Smit, Supreme Court]; Quinn Smith, Redefining International Arbitration in the
United States: The Application of 1782 to International Arbitration Proceedings Located in the United
States, 2009 SPAIN ARBITRATION REVIEW / REVISTA DEL CLUB ESPAÑOL DEL ARBITRAJE 93, 105;
Maurice M. Suh & Diana L. Trembly, Section 1782 Discovery in International Arbitration: Factors to
Consider in Light of U.S. Case Law, 66 DISP. RESOL. J. 72, 74-79 (Feb.-Apr. 2011).
19
See 28 U.S.C. §1782.
20
See id. Numerous misunderstandings exist about the nature of the various types of domestic and
international arbitration. See S.I. Strong, Navigating the Borders Between International Commercial
Arbitration and U.S. Federal Courts: A Jurisprudential GPS, 2012 J. DISP. RESOL. 119, 123-28.
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Given the potential for confusion in this area of law, it is best to begin with a few brief
definitions. First, this Article limits use of the term “investment arbitration” to arbitral
proceedings that arise out of an international investment treaty or interstate agreement, rather
than those that arise solely out of an investment contract between a private party and a state.21
Second, this Article uses the term “international commercial arbitration” to refer to proceedings
arising entirely between private parties as well as to those arising between a private party and a
state behaving as a private commercial actor.22 Although some debate exists as to whether an
arbitration between a state and a private party arising out of a foreign investment contract
constitutes an investment arbitration or an international commercial arbitration, that issue is
beyond the scope of the current discussion.23
The structure of the Article is as follows. The analysis begins in Section II with a brief
description of the historic development of Section 1782 and the various rationales regarding its
use in cases involving both international commercial and investment arbitration.24 Next, Section
III discusses Section 1782 requests in the context of both types of international arbitration,
considering not only the propriety of such requests in each circumstance and distinguishing
between international commercial and investment proceedings but also introducing the
possibility that some of these issues could be resolved through use of various interpretive canons

21

Investment arbitrations arise from a variety of sources, including bilateral investment treaties (BITs),
multilateral investment treaties (MITs), investment protection agreements (IPAs), free trade agreements
(FTAs) and foreign investment laws. See MCLACHLAN ET AL., supra note 7, at 25-43; see also LUCY
REED ET AL., GUIDE TO ICSID ARBITRATION (2010); CHRISTOPH H. SCHREUER, THE ICSID
CONVENTION: A COMMENTARY (2001).
22
See JULIAN D.M. LEW ET AL., COMPARATIVE INTERNATIONAL COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION ¶¶27-3 to
27-83 (2003).
23
See Gus van Harten, The Public-Private Distinction in the International Arbitration of Individual
Claims Against the State, 56 INT’L & COMP. L. Q. 371, 374 (2007); see also Gary Born, A New
Generation of International Adjudication, 61 DUKE L.J. 775, 826-31 (2012) [hereinafter Born,
Adjudication].
24
See 28 U.S.C. §1782.
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intended to minimize or avoid conflicts between domestic and international law.25 Finally, the
Article provides a number of concluding thoughts and proposals in Section IV.

II.

Arbitration and 28 U.S.C. §1782

A.

Historic Developments

Before addressing the current crisis concerning the use of 28 U.S.C. §1782, it is helpful to
summarize briefly some key historical developments in this area of law.26 Discussion begins
with the text of the statute, which states:
The district court of the district in which a person resides or is found may order
him to give his testimony or statement or to produce a document or other thing for
use in a proceeding in a foreign or international tribunal.
The order may be made pursuant to a letter rogatory issued, or request made, by a
foreign or international tribunal or upon the application of any interested person
and may direct that the testimony or statement be given, or the document or other
thing be produced, before a person appointed by the court. . . . The order may
prescribe the practice and procedure, which may be in whole or part the practice
and procedure of the foreign country or the international tribunal, for taking the
testimony or statement or producing the document or other thing. To the extent
that the order does not prescribe otherwise, the testimony or statement shall be
taken, and the document or other thing produced, in accordance with the Federal
Rules of Civil Procedure.
A person may not be compelled to give his testimony or statement or to produce a
document or other thing in violation of any legally applicable privilege.27
Although this language appears relatively clear on its face, certain ambiguities exist,
particularly with respect to whether the term “foreign or international tribunal” includes arbitral

25

See id.
Additional reading regarding the legislative and judicial history of Section 1782 in cases involving
international arbitration is available. See id.; Beale et al., supra note 18, at 56-98; Chukwumerije, supra
note 18, at 654-60; Dubinsky, supra note 18, at 334-41; Fellas, supra note 18, at 385-99; Lamelas, supra
note 18, at 154-56; Martinez-Fraga, supra note 18, at 90-93; Rothstein, supra note 18, at 68-79; Smit,
Judicial Assistance, supra note 18, at 153-61; Smit, Supreme Court, supra note 18, at 296-332.
27
28 U.S.C. §1782.
26

8

tribunals and if so, which types.28 Three different forms of arbitration could ostensibly fall
within the terms of the statute: interstate arbitration (i.e., arbitration between two different
nations), investor-state arbitration and international commercial arbitration. Most of the
theoretical and practical debate to date has involved international commercial and investment
arbitration, since interstate arbitration is relatively rare, despite its ancient roots.29
Initially, U.S. courts opposed the use of Section 1782 in arbitration-related matters, with
the Second Circuit stating authoritatively that “the fact that the term ‘foreign or international
tribunals’ is broad enough to include both state-sponsored and private tribunals fails to mandate a
conclusion that the term, as used in §1782, does include both.”30 Although the Second Circuit
based its decision on both the text of the statute and its legislative history, the court was also
influenced by the fact that “the popularity of arbitration ‘rests in considerable part on its asserted
efficiency and cost-effectiveness – characteristics said to be at odds with full-scale litigation in
the courts, and especially at odds with the broad-ranging discovery made possible by the Federal
Rules of Civil Procedure.’”31
Although the Second Circuit was speaking in 1999, the U.S. Supreme Court has recently
reiterated its support for the twin rationales of efficiency and cost-effectiveness in arbitration in

28

See id.
See GARY B. BORN, INTERNATIONAL COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION 8-20 (2009); Born, Adjudication,
supra note 23, at 797-99.
30
National Broadcasting Co., Inc. v. Bear Stearns & Co., Inc., 165 F.3d 184, 188 (2d Cir. 1999); see also
28 U.S.C. §1782; Republic of Kazkhstan v. Biedermann Int’l, 168 F.3d 880, 882-83 (5th Cir. 1999); Beale
et al., supra note 18, at 60.
31
Beale et al., supra note 18, at 63 (quoting National Broadcasting Co., 165 F.3d at 190-91); see also
Biedermann, 168 F.3d at 882-83; La Comision Ejecutiva Hidroelecctrica Del Rio Lempa v. El Paso
Corp., 617 F. Supp. 2d 481, 485–87 (S.D. Tex. 2008) (noting that the Supreme Court “may find it
determinative that ‘[a]rbitration is intended as a speedy, economical, and effective means of dispute
resolution,’ and, thus, that extensive discovery through federal courts would harm, rather than benefit,
international comity”), aff’d, 341 Fed. App’x 31 (5th Cir. 2009).
29

9

several different opinions.32 While the Court was not considering issues relating to Section
1782, these decisions suggest that the Second Circuit’s approach is consistent with current
Supreme Court jurisprudence regarding arbitration.33
The judicial prohibition on using Section 1782 in connection with arbitral proceedings
was absolute and largely unquestioned until 2004, when the U.S. Supreme Court adopted a more
expansive interpretation of the term “foreign or international tribunal” than had previously been
seen in the lower courts.34 Notably, the case in question, Intel Corp. v. Advanced Micro Devices,
Inc., did not involve arbitration.35 Instead, the underlying dispute involved an investigation by
the Directorate-General for Competition (part of the Commission of the European Communities)
into certain potential violations of European competition law.36 Although the DirectorateGeneral and the European Commission normally do not operate in an adjudicatory fashion, the
Directorate-General was in this instance acting as what was effectively the taker of proof for the
Court of First Instance and the European Court of Justice (ECJ).37 Since neither of the two
courts would be allowed to accept new evidence if the matter were ever made subject to judicial

32

See AT&T Mobility LLC v. Concepcion, 131 S. Ct. 1740, 1751-53 (2011); Stolt-Nielsen S.A. v.
AnimalFeeds Int’l Corp., 130 S. Ct. 1758, 1775-76 (2010). The Court is currently considering two cases
that may shed further light on this issue. See Sutter v. Oxford Health Plans LLC, 675 F.3d 215 (3d Cir.),
cert. granted, 133 S. Ct. 786 (2012); In re Am. Express Merchs. Litig., 667 F.3d 204 (2d Cir.), cert.
granted sub nom. Am. Express Co. v. Italian Colors Rest., 133 S. Ct. 594 (2012). Some commentators
have suggested that the Supreme Court badly misunderstood the nature of arbitration in some of these
decisions. See Gary Born & Claudio Salas, The U.S. Supreme Court and Class Arbitration: A Tragedy of
Errors, 2012 J. DISP. RESOL. 21, 22; S.I. Strong, Does Class Arbitration “Change the Nature” of
Arbitration? Stolt-Nielsen, AT&T and a Return to First Principles, 17 HARV. NEGOT. L. REV. 201, 24668 (2012) [hereinafter Strong, First Principles].
33
See 28 U.S.C. §1782; see also Conley, supra note 18, at 46 (“Giving parties to international arbitrations
access to judicial assistance pursuant to §1782 will undermine many of the policies underlying arbitration,
including freedom to contract, reduced cost, efficiency and the arbitrator’s ability to control discovery.”).
34
28 U.S.C. §1782; see also Intel Corp. v. Advanced Micro Devices, Inc., 542 U.S. 241, 258 (2004).
35
See Intel, 542 U.S. at 241.
36
See id.; see also Directorate General for Competition, http://ec.europa.eu/dgs/competition/.
37
See Intel, 542 U.S. at 242- 243.
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review, the U.S. Supreme Court decided that the Directorate-General was acting as a “foreign or
international tribunal” within the meaning of Section 1782.38
In reaching this conclusion, the Supreme Court interpreted the term “foreign or
international tribunal” in Section 1782 as including “first-instance decision-makers” that render
“dispositive rulings” that are subject to some form of judicial review.39 The Court suggested that
the range of “first-instance decision-makers” could be read quite broadly, thereby allowing U.S.
courts to make discovery orders in situations involving “investigating magistrates, administrative
and arbitral tribunals, and quasi-judicial agencies, as well as conventional civil, commercial,
criminal, and administrative courts.”40
Subsequent courts and commentators have read much into the Supreme Court’s use of the
term “arbitral tribunal,” even though the reference was technically made ober dicta.41 In many
ways, the weight given to this phrase is somewhat surprising, given that the language does not
come from the statute’s legislative history but from a law review article written in 1965, one year
after the statute was revised to reflect its current form.42 Although the article cited by the Court
was written by Professor Hans Smit, one of the drafters of the revisions to Section 1782, another
article that was written by Professor Smit and explicitly cited in the Senate reports as justifying
the proposed revisions fails to mention arbitration at all.43

38

28 U.S.C. §1782; Intel, 542 U.S. at 257-58.
See Intel, 542 U.S. at 258-59 (quoting Hans Smit, International Litigation Under the United States
Code, 65 COLUM. L. REV. 1015, 1026 n.71 (1965) [hereinafter Smit, United States Code]); Alford, supra
note 3, at 134.
40
See Intel, 542 U.S. at 258 (citing legislative history and Smit, United States Code, supra note 40, at
1026 n.71); Alford, supra note 3, at 134.
41
See 28 U.S.C. §1782; Intel, 542 U.S. at 258; Suh & Trembly, supra note 18, at 77.
42
See Intel, 542 U.S. at 258; Smit, United States Code, supra note 40, at 1026 n.71; see also Smit,
Supreme Court, supra note 18, at 298; Suh & Trembly, supra note 18, at 77.
43
See 28 U.S.C. §1782; Intel, 542 U.S. at 258; S. REP. NO. 1580, 88th Cong., 2d Sess. (1964), 1964
U.S.C.C.A.N. 3782; Hans Smit, International Aspects of Federal Civil Procedure, 61 COLUM. L. REV.
1031 (1961).
39
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Furthermore, some courts have noted that although the Supreme Court cited Professor
Smit’s expansive language “with approval,” the Court deleted that aspect of Smit’s definition
“that included ‘all bodies exercising adjudicatory powers,’” a move that “could be interpreted to
support a finding that private arbitration organizations are not ‘foreign tribunals.’”44 Other
courts have suggested that it would be strange for the Supreme Court to have overruled existing
precedent (which was at that time universally against the use of Section 1782 in the context of all
types of international arbitration) without explicitly mentioning that intention.45 As a result, the
statute’s legislative history is inconclusive regarding whether and to what extent Section 1782
might be applied to arbitration.46
Even if Congress could be supposed to have meant to include arbitral tribunals as a type
of “foreign or international tribunal,” it is entirely unclear whether that intent should be
considered to include all types of arbitration currently in existence, since only one form of
international arbitration – interstate arbitration – was well-known in 1964, when the statute was
revised.47 Indeed, in 1964, none of the multilateral treaties regarding international commercial or
investment arbitration had yet been ratified by the United States,48 and the era of bilateral
investment arbitration was still decades away.49

44

In re Finserve Group Ltd., No. 4:11–mc–2044–RBH, 2011 WL 5024264, at *2 (D. S.C. Oct 20, 2011)
(citing In re Norfolk Southern Corp., 626 F. Supp. 2d 882, 885 (N.D. Ill. 2009)); see also In re Rhodianyl
S.A.S., No. 11-1026-JTM, 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 72918, at *47-48 (D. Kan. Mar. 25, 2011). Thus, some
courts have interpreted the ellipses in Intel’s quote of Professor Smit’s article as “including statesponsored arbitral bodies but excluding purely private arbitrations.” Norfolk Southern, 626 F. Supp. 2d at
885 (citing Republic of Kazkhstan v. Biedermann Int’l, 168 F.3d 880, 882 (5th Cir. 1999)).
45
See In re Rhodianyl, 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 72918, at *35.
46
See 28 U.S.C. §1782; S. REP. NO. 1580, 88th Cong., 2d Sess. (1964), 1964 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3782.
Indeed, the Senate report refers almost entirely to “litigants,” with only one reference to a “party to the
foreign or international litigation.” S. REP. NO. 1580, 88th Cong., 2d Sess. (1964), 1964 U.S.C.C.A.N.
3782. These terms are not typically used to describe parties in arbitration.
47
28 U.S.C. §1782; see also Born, Adjudication, supra note 23, at 797-98.
48
See Beale et al., supra note 18, at 58; Rothstein, supra note 18, at 73-74. The United States has ratified
two major international treaties concerning international commercial arbitration. See Inter-American
Convention on International Commercial Arbitration, Jan. 30, 1975, O.A.S.T.S. No. 42, 14 I.L.M. 336
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One of the more prominent features of Intel is the relatively comprehensive discussion of
the various discretionary factors that should be considered in connection with a request for
discovery under Section 1782.50 These factors focus on “the nature and character of the foreign
or international proceedings, the foreign or international court’s receptivity to the discovery, and
whether the discovery will circumvent restrictions imposed by the foreign or international
court.”51 Lower courts are also advised to “consider whether the §1782(a) request conceals an
attempt to circumvent foreign proof-gathering restrictions or other policies of a foreign country
or the United States.”52 Notably, however, these discretionary factors only come into play once
the court has determined that the underlying proceeding involves a “foreign or international
tribunal” under the statute.53
Most of the recent jurisprudence relating to the confluence of Section 1782 and
arbitration has focused on Intel’s discretionary factors rather than on the statutory prerequisites

(1975) [hereinafter Panama Convention]; United Nations Convention on the Recognition and
Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards, June 10, 1958, 330 U.N.T.S. 3 [hereinafter New York
Convention]; BORN, supra note 29, at 92. The first of these instruments was ratified in 1970. See United
Nations Commission on International Trade Law, New York Convention, Status [hereinafter New York
Convention Status], available at
http://www.uncitral.org/uncitral/en/uncitral_texts/arbitration/NYConvention_status.html; BORN, supra
note 29, at 98. The second was ratified in 1990. See Organization of American States, Inter-American
Convention on International Commercial Arbitration, Status, available at
http://www.oas.org/juridico/english/treaties/b-35.html; John P. Bowman, The Panama Convention and its
Implementation Under the Federal Arbitration Act, 11 AM. REV. INT’L ARB. 1, 2 (2000). The United
States signed the primary multilateral convention on investment law, the Convention on the Settlement of
Investment Disputes between States and Nationals of Other States (ICSID Convention) in 1965, although
the Convention was not ratified until 1966. See Convention on the Settlement of Investment Disputes
between States and Nationals of Other States, Mar. 18, 1965, [1966] 17 U.S.T. 1291, T.I.A.S. No. 6090
[hereinafter ICSID Convention]; ICSID, List of Contracting States and Other Signatories, available at
https://icsid.worldbank.org/ICSID/FrontServlet?requestType=ICSIDDocRH&actionVal=ContractingState
s&ReqFrom=Main [hereinafter ICSID Status].
49
Most bilateral investment treaties did not begin to include arbitration provisions under the mid-1980s.
See Born, Adjudication, supra note 23, at 833.
50
See Intel Corp. v. Advanced Micro Devices, Inc., 542 U.S. 241, 264 (2004); see also 28 U.S.C. §1782.
51
Alford, supra note 3, at 138; see also Intel, 542 U.S. at 264.
52
Intel, 542 U.S. at 264-65; see also 28 U.S.C. §1782.
53
See Intel, 542 U.S. at 264.
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relating to the definition of a “foreign or international tribunal.”54 This phenomenon is
somewhat problematic, since it is not entirely clear that tribunals in international commercial and
investment arbitration fall within the statutory definition of a “foreign or international tribunal”
in the first place.55 If arbitration does not fall within the terms of the statute, then there is no
need to consider the applicability of the discretionary factors outlined in Intel.56 Therefore, this
Article focuses on issues relating to the definition of a “foreign or international tribunal” and
leaves discussion of Intel’s discretionary factors for another day.57

B.

Post-Intel Jurisprudence Regarding Investment Arbitration

One commentator has suggested that the post-Intel jurisprudence indicates that “federal courts
uniformly agree that an arbitral tribunal established pursuant to a bilateral investment treaty
constitutes an ‘international tribunal’ within the meaning of the statute.”58 However, existing

54

This phenomenon has been most prevalent in the context of cases associated with the Chevron-Ecuador
dispute. See 28 U.S.C. §1782; see also Alford, supra note 3, at 137-38. However, some courts have also
considered the discretionary factors in cases involving international commercial arbitration. See In re
Finserve Group Ltd., No. 4:11–mc–2044–RBH, 2011 WL 5024264, at *3 (D. S.C. Oct 20, 2011); In re
Rhodianyl S.A.S., No. 11-1026-JTM, 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 72918, at *50-53 (D. Kan. Mar. 25, 2011);
Ex rel Winning (HK) Int’l Shipping Co. Ltd., No. 09-22659-MC, 2010 WL 1796579, at *9 (S.D. Fla.
Apr. 30, 2010); OJSC Ukrnafta v. Carpatsky Petroleum Corp., No. 3:09 MC 265(JBA), 2009 WL
2877156, at *2–5 (D. Conn. Aug. 27, 2009); In re Babcock Borsig AG, 583 F. Supp. 2d 233, 240-41 (D.
Mass. 2008).
55
28 U.S.C. §1782; see also infra notes 156-454 and accompanying text.
56
See Intel, 542 U.S. at 264-65.
57
28 U.S.C. §1782; see also Intel, 542 U.S. at 264-65.
58
Alford, supra note 3, at 136 (noting that there have been “over twenty” federal court decisions
concerning Section 1782 requests in the investment treaty contest since Intel and suggesting that all such
proceedings meet the statutory requirement for a “foreign or international tribunal”); see also 28 U.S.C.
§1782; Republic of Ecuador v. Connor, 708 F.3d 651, 657 (5th Cir. 2013); In re Application of Chevron
Corp., 650 F.3d 276 (3d Cir. 2011); In re Application of Chevron Corp., 633 F.3d 153, 161 (3d Cir.
2011); In re Application of Ecuador, Nos. C. 11-80171 CRB, 11-80172 CRB, 2011 WL 4434816, at *2
(N.D. Cal. Sept. 23, 2011); In re Application of Ecuador, No. 2:11-mc-00052 GSA, 2011 WL 4089189, at
*2 (E.D. Cal. Sept. 13, 2011); Republic of Ecuador v. Bjorkman, 801 F. Supp. 2d 1121, 1124 (D. Colo.
2011), aff’d 2011 WL 5439681 (D. Colo. Nov. 9, 2011); In re Republic of Ecuador, Nos. C-10-80225
MISC CRB (EMC), C-10-80324 MISC CRB (EMC), 2011 WL 736868, at *1–3 (N.D. Cal. Feb. 22,
2011); In re Application of Chevron Corp., 762 F. Supp. 2d 242, 250–52 (D. Mass. 2010); Chevron Corp.
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judicial analysis of this issue is troubling for a number of reasons.59 Furthermore, a stark
difference can be seen in the analytical framework used before and after the initiation of the
various requests in the Chevron-Ecuador dispute.60

1.

Cases rendered prior to the Chevron-Ecuador dispute

The discussion begins with decisions rendered prior to the Chevron-Ecuador dispute. Only a few
such cases exist, since relatively little time transpired between the U.S. Supreme Court decision
in Intel and the advent of the Section 1782 requests in the Chevron-Ecuador dispute.61
Nevertheless, one decision – In re Oxus Gold PLC – became highly influential during this time
period and is representative of the type of approach used by courts considering the interplay
between Section 1782 and investment arbitration.62

v. Shefftz, 754 F. Supp. 2d 254, 260 (D. Mass. 2010); In re Republic of Ecuador, No. C-10-80225 MISC
CRB (EMC), 2010 WL 4973492, at *6–8 (N.D. Cal. Dec. 1, 2010); In re Chevron Corp., 709 F. Supp. 2d
283, 291 (S.D.N.Y. 2010), aff’d sub nom., Chevron Corp. v. Berlinger, 629 F.3d 297 (2d. Cir. 2011); In re
Application of Caratube Int’l Oil Co., 730 F. Supp. 2d 101, 104–05 (D.D.C. 2010); In re Application of
Chevron Corp., 749 F. Supp. 2d 141, 159–160 (S.D.N.Y. 2010); In re Application of Ricardo Veiga, 746
F. Supp. 2d 8, 22–23 (D.D.C. 2010); In re Chevron Corp., 753 F. Supp. 2d 536, 539 (D. Md. Nov. 24,
2010); In re Chevron Corp., No. 7:10-mc-00067, 2010 WL 4883111, at *2 n.2 (W.D. Va. Nov. 24, 2010);
In re Republic of Ecuador, No. 1:10-mc-00040 GSA, 2010 WL 4027740, at *2 (E.D. Cal. Oct. 14, 2010);
In re Republic of Ecuador, No. C-10-80225 MISC CRB (EMC), 2010 WL 3702427, at *3 (N.D. Cal.
Sept. 15, 2010); Chevron Corp. v. Camp, Nos. 1:10mc27, 1:10mc28, 2010 WL 3418394, at *4 (W.D.N.C.
Aug. 30, 2010); Chevron Corp. v. Stratus Consulting, Inc., No. 10-cv-00047-MSK-MEH, 2010 WL
2135217 (D. Colo. May 25, 2010); Chevron Corp. v. Stratus Consulting, Inc., No. 10-cv-00047-MSKMEH, 2010 WL 1488010 (D. Colo. Apr. 13, 2010); Order, In re Chevron, No. 1:10-MI-0076-TWT-GGB,
2010 WL 8767265 (N.D. Ga. Mar. 2, 2010); In re Application of Oxus Gold PLC, No. MISC 06-82, 2006
WL 2927615 (D.N.J. Oct. 11, 2006); see also In re Mesa Power Group, LLC, No. 2:11-mc-280-ES, 2012
WL 6060941, at *5 (D.N.J. Nov. 20, 2012).
59
See infra notes 86-110 and accompanying text.
60
See infra notes 61-85 and accompanying text.
61
See 28 U.S.C. §1782; Intel, 542 U.S. at 241; In re Chevron, 753 F. Supp. 2d at 536; In re Oxus Gold,
2006 WL 2927615. There is also a dearth of scholarly analysis of Section 1782 in the context of
investment arbitration. See Alford, supra note 3, at 155.
62
See In re Oxus Gold, 2006 WL 2927615; see also In re Norfolk Southern Corp., 626 F. Supp. 2d 882,
886 (N.D. Ill. 2009) (citing In re Oxus Gold with approval).
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The precedential value of In re Oxus Gold is somewhat surprising, given the extremely
cursory nature of the relevant discussion.63 Indeed, the entirety of the court’s analysis is summed
up in the statement that
[t]he international arbitration at issue is being conducted by the United Nations
Commission on International Law, a body operating under the United Nations and
established by its member states. The arbitration is not the result of a contract or
agreement between private parties as in National Broadcasting. The proceedings
in issue has [sic] been authorized by the sovereign states of the United Kingdom
and the Kyrgyzstan Republic for the purpose of adjudicating disputes under the
Bilateral Investment Treaty. Therefore, it appears to the Court as if the
international arbitration proceeding in the present case is included as a “foreign or
international tribunal” in Section 1782.64
Although this approach may be attractive to the extent it enunciates a clear, bright line
rule, the court’s analysis actually contains a number of legal and factual errors.65 First, the
suggestion that the United Nations Commission on International Law (UNCITRAL), “a body
operating under the United Nations and established by its member states,” is somehow involved
in the administration of bilateral and other investment arbitrations is incorrect.66 Although
UNCITRAL has promulgated certain arbitral rules that are often used in investment arbitration,
neither the United Nations nor UNCITRAL plays any role in administering the arbitrations that
proceed under those rules.67 Indeed, UNCITRAL developed its arbitration rules (UNCITRAL

63

See In re Oxus Gold, 2006 WL 2927615 at *6.
Id. (citations omitted).
65
See In re Norfolk Southern, 626 F. Supp. 2d at 886; OJSC Ukrnafta v. Carpatsky Petroleum Corp., No.
3:09 MC 265(JBA), 2009 WL 2877156, at *4 (D. Conn. Aug. 27, 2009).
66
Ukrnafta, 2009 WL 2877156 at *4 (citing In re Arbitration in London, No. 09 C 3092, 2009 WL
1665936, at *3 (N.D. Ill. June 15, 2009) and In re Oxus Gold, 2006 WL 1037387 at *5).
67
See UNCITRAL Arbitration Rules, G.A. Res. 65/22, U.N. Doc. A/RES/65/22 (Jan. 10, 2011)
[hereinafter UNCITRAL 2010 Rules], available at
http://www.uncitral.org/pdf/english/texts/arbitration/arb-rules-revised/arb-rules-revised-2010-e.pdf;
UNCITRAL Arbitration Rules, G.A. Res. 31/98, UNCITRAL, 31st Sess., Supp. No. 17 at 34, U.N. Doc.
A/31/17 (Apr. 28, 1976) [hereinafter UNCITRAL 1976 Rules], available at
http://www.uncitral.org/pdf/english/texts/arbitration/arb-rules/arb-rules.pdf; S.I. STRONG,
INTERNATIONAL COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION: A GUIDE FOR U.S. JUDGES 9 (2013).
64
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Arbitration Rules) specifically for use in ad hoc (i.e., non-administered) proceedings.68
Although the UNCITRAL Arbitration Rules can be used in administered proceedings,
UNCITRAL is not the administering body in those cases.69
Second, the court in In re Oxus Gold appears to assume that only treaty-based arbitrations
proceed under the UNCITRAL Arbitration Rules.70 Again, this assumption is incorrect, since
the UNCITRAL Arbitration Rules can be used in both public (i.e., treaty-based) and private (i.e.,
contract-based) proceedings.71 Indeed, UNCITRAL initially developed its arbitration rules in
1976 for use in private commercial proceedings (at that point, investment arbitration was largely
non-existent).72 Although the UNCITRAL Arbitration Rules were revised in 2010 to include a
number of provisions designed to facilitate treaty-based arbitrations, the revised rules are
nevertheless still available for use in private commercial proceedings.73
Third, some courts following In re Oxus Gold have suggested that the UNCITRAL
Arbitration Rules constitute a type of “international law” that can transform a tribunal into a
“foreign or international tribunal” for purposes of Section 1782.74 This statement reflects a

68

See UNCITRAL 2010 Rules, supra note 67; UNCITRAL 1976 Rules, supra note 67; LEW ET AL.,
supra note 22, ¶¶3-4 to 3-11.
69
See LEW ET AL., supra note 22, ¶3-11. Some courts have properly recognized this distinction and have
suggested that a BIT arbitration was “private” because it was “governed by the Arbitration Rules of the
United Nations Commission on International Trade Law (‘UNCITRAL’), not officially sanctioned by the
United Nations Commission on International Trade Law or any other official authority.” Chevron Corp.,
No. 7:10-mc-00067, 2010 WL 4883111, at *2 n.2 (W.D. Va. Nov. 24, 2010); see also Chevron Corp. v.
Shefftz, 754 F. Supp. 2d 254, 260 (D. Mass. 2010).
70
See In re Oxus Gold, 2006 WL 2927615 at *6; see also Ukrnafta, 2009 WL 2877156 at *4;
UNCITRAL 2010 Rules, supra note 67; UNCITRAL 1976 Rules, supra note 67.
71
See UNCITRAL 2010 Rules, supra note 67; UNCITRAL 1976 Rules, supra note 67; LEW ET AL.,
supra note 22, ¶¶21-10, 28-6.
72
See UNCITRAL 1976 Rules, supra note 67; LEW ET AL., supra note 22, ¶3-11.
73
See UNCITRAL 2010 Rules, supra note 67; Andrea K. Bjorklund, The Emerging Civilization of
Investment Arbitration, 113 PENN ST. L. REV. 1269, 1289-90 (2009).
74
See 1782 U.S.C. §1782 (2013); Ukrnafta, 2009 WL 2877156 at *4 (citing In re Oxus Gold, 2006 WL
2927615 at *6, for the proposition that “an arbitration panel governed by international law, namely, the
UNCITRAL rules of arbitration, constitutes a ‘foreign tribunal’ for the purposes of Section 1782”
(citation omitted)).

17

fundamental misunderstanding of both international arbitration and international law, in that
procedural rules such as the UNCITRAL Arbitration Rules do not constitute “international law”
any more than the rules of a private arbitral institution do.75 This approach also suggests that the
nature of the underlying substantive or procedural law should determine the nature of the
tribunal.76 However, that conclusion cannot be correct, since an arbitration or litigation located
outside the United States cannot be considered a U.S. proceeding simply because the dispute is
governed by U.S. substantive law or by the arbitral rules of a U.S.-based arbitral institution such
as the AAA.77 Similarly, an arbitration or litigation governed by non-U.S. law but situated in the
United States cannot be transformed into a “foreign or international tribunal” simply as a
function of the parties’ choice of procedural or substantive law.78

75

The confusion may relate to the fact that UNCITRAL promulgates a number of model laws (such as
those concerning arbitration, insolvency and electronic commerce) and international conventions (such as
those regarding the carriage of goods by sea or the international sales of goods) that can be subsequently
adopted by states. See UNCITRAL, Publications,
http://www.uncitral.org/uncitral/publications/publications.html; see also UNCITRAL, Texts and Status,
http://www.uncitral.org/uncitral/en/uncitral_texts.html; Susan Block-Lieb & Terence C. Halliday,
Incrementalism in Global Lawmaking, 23 BROOKLYN J. INT’L L. 851, 864-86 (2007) (discussing
UNCITRAL’s work in arbitration and other subject matter areas). However, the UNCITRAL Arbitration
Rules do not fall into this category of instruments and are instead adopted by individual parties, be they
private parties or state parties. See UNCITRAL 2010 Rules, supra note 67; UNCITRAL 1976 Rules,
supra note 67; LEW ET AL., supra note 22, ¶¶3-4, 28-6.
76
This approach is problematic. See infra notes 390-94 and accompanying text.
77
See AAA, Rules & Procedures, http://www.adr.org.
78
Section 1782 is generally considered not to apply to proceedings within the United States. See 28
U.S.C. §1782; Rau, Third Parties, supra note 18, at 35. However, allowing Section 1782 requests in
arbitrations seated abroad could open the door to arguments that Section 1782 could or should also apply
to some proceedings seated within the United States on the grounds that such arbitrations are “nondomestic.” See 28 U.S.C. §1782; Rothstein, supra note 18, at 78 (noting that “after holding that a foreign
private arbitration is a §1782 ‘foreign tribunal,’ it would be difficult to explain why a private international
arbitration in the United States is not a §1782 ‘international tribunal’”); see also National Broadcasting
Co., Inc. v. Bear Stearns & Co., Inc., 165 F.3d 184, 191 (2d Cir. 1999) (declining to extend Section 1782
to arbitration since to do so “not only would be devoid of principle, but also would create an entirely new
category of dispute concerning . . . the characterization of arbitral panels as domestic, foreign or
international”); STRONG, supra note 67, at 27-29 (discussing foreign, domestic and non-domestic awards
in international commercial arbitration).
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In re Oxus Gold is not the only judicial decision to misunderstand the nature of
investment arbitration.79 For example, one court took the view that “[t]he Intel court’s reference
to ‘arbitral tribunals,’ at minimum, would include international-government sanctioned
tribunals” because “[r]eferences in the United States Code to ‘arbitral tribunals’ almost
uniformly concern an adjunct of a foreign government or international agency.” 80 However, the
investment arbitration regime does not arise as a result of the efforts of a single political actor or
international agency, but is instead the product of a “patchwork quilt of interlocking but separate
bilateral treaties.”81 As a result, investment arbitration cannot constitute “an adjunct of a foreign
government or international agency” within the meaning of that court’s analysis.82
These examples demonstrate how problematic early analysis of Section 1782 was.83
Although there was a chance that the errors reflected in these early decisions could have been
corrected in the mass of opinions arising out of the Chevron-Ecuador dispute, the legal and
factual complexity of the Chevron-Ecuador controversy 84 seems to have made courts even less
inclined to delve into difficult questions relating to the propriety of Section 1782 requests in

79

See In re Oxus Gold, 2006 WL 2927615 at *6.
OJSC Ukrnafta v. Carpatsky Petroleum Corp., No. 3:09 MC 265(JBA), 2009 WL 2877156, at *4 (D.
Conn. Aug. 27, 2009); see also Intel Corp. v. Advanced Micro Devices, Inc., 542 U.S. 241, 258 (2004);
infra notes 452-54 and accompanying text.
81
MCLACHLAN ET AL., supra note 7, at 5.
82
See Ukrnafta, 2009 WL 2877196 at *4.
83
See 28 U.S.C. §1782; Alford, supra note 3, at 138-39.
84
A detailed history of the dispute is available from several sources. See In re Chevron Corp., 749 F.
Supp. 2d 141 (S.D.N.Y.), aff’d, Lago Agrio Plaintiffs v. Chevron Corp., 409 Fed. App’x 393 (2d Cir.
2010); see also Chevron Corp. v. Berlinger, 629 F.3d 297, 300-306 (2d Cir. 2011); In re Chevron Corp.,
650 F.3d 276, 279-86 (3d Cir. 2011); In re Chevron Corp., 633 F.3d 153, 156-60 (3d Cir. 2011); Chevron
Corp. v. Salazar, 275 F.R.D. 437, 440-43 (S.D.N.Y. 2011) (identifying several decisions with more
detailed procedural histories); Chevron Corp. v. Donziger, 768 F. Supp. 2d 581, 597-626 (S.D.N.Y.
2011)), vacated by Chevron Corp. v. Naranjo, No. 11-1150-CV L, 2011 WL 4375022 (2d Cir. Sept. 19,
2011), decision reversed and remanded by Chevron Corp. v. Naranjo, 667 F.3d 232, 234 (2d Cir. 2012);
Alford, supra note 3, at 138-39; Kimerling, Oil, supra note 1, at 63-98; History of Texaco and Chevron in
Ecuador, available at http://www.texaco.com/sitelets/ecuador/en/history/chronologyofevents.aspx; see
also supra notes 1-8 and accompanying text.
80
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cases involving investment arbitration.85 Indeed, decisions arising out of the Chevron-Ecuador
dispute reflect a new series of problems.

2.

The Chevron-Ecuador dispute

At this point, the Chevron-Ecuador dispute has generated the “vast majority” of Section 1782
requests in the context of investment arbitration, even though tactical use of Section 1782 in that
matter did not begin until 2010.86 Unfortunately, most of the decisions in this line of cases have
reflected one or more of the following four problems.
First, courts considering Section 1782 requests in the context of the Chevron-Ecuador
dispute typically do not take into account the fact that there are usually several different conflict
resolution processes (including both litigation and arbitration) that are ongoing at the same
time.87 Thus, for example, a court may be asked to consider the propriety of a discovery request
intended for “use in the Lago Agrio litigation itself, criminal proceedings . . . that have been
instituted . . . in Ecuador, and an arbitration . . . with the United Nations Commission on

85

See 28 U.S.C. §1782.
Alford, supra note 3, at 137; see also 28 U.S.C. §1782; Alford, supra note 3, at 128, 155. Chevron
initiated the tactical use of Section 1782 requests, although the Republic of Ecuador and the Ecuadorian
plaintiffs eventually adopted a similar strategy. See In re Chevron, 650 F.3d at 282 n.7; In re Chevron
Corp., No. 11-24599-CV, 2012 WL 3636925, at *11 (S.D. Fla. June 12, 2012); Alford, supra note 3, at
145, 155; see also Beale et al., supra note 18, at 84-85, 87-89.
87
See In re Chevron, 650 F.3d at 279-86; Berlinger, 629 F.3d at 305; In re Chevron, 2012 WL 3636925
at *4, 7, 11; In re Republic of Ecuador, Nos. C-10-80225 MISC CRB (EMC), C-10-80324 MISC CRB
(EMC), 2011 WL 736868, at *2-3, 6 (N.D. Cal. Feb. 22, 2011); In re Republic of Ecuador, No. C-1080225 MISC CRB (EMC), 2010 WL 4973492, at *8 (N.D. Cal. Dec. 1, 2010), reconsid. denied, 2011
WL 736868 (N.D. Cal. Feb. 22, 2011); Chevron Corp. v. Shefftz, 754 F. Suppl. 2d 254, 260 (D. Mass.
2010); In re Chevron Corp., 762 F. Supp. 2d 242, 247-48 (D. Mass. 2010); Chevron Corp., No. 7:10-mc00067, 2010 WL 4883111, at *3 (W.D. Va. Nov. 24, 2010); In re Veiga, 746 F. Supp. 2d 8, 18, 20
(D.C.D.C.), appeal dismissed 2010 WL 5140467 (D.C. Cir. Dec. 17, 2010), appeal dismissed, 2011 WL
1765213 (D.C. Cir. Apr. 18, 2011); Chevron Corp., Nos. 10-MC-21JH/LFG, 20-MC-22 JH/LFG, 2010
WL 8786279, at *6 (D. N.M. Sept. 1, 2010), objections overruled, 2010 WL 8786202 (D. N.M. Sept. 13,
2010); In re Chevron Corp., 709 F. Supp. 2d 283, 291 (S.D.N.Y. 2010), aff’d, 629 F. 3d 297 (2d Cir.
2011); In re Chevron Corp., No. 1:10-MI-0076-TWT-GGB, 2010 WL 8767265, at *4 (N.D. Ga. Mar. 2,
2010).
86
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International Trade Law (UNCITRAL) pursuant to the United States-Ecuador Bilateral
Investment Treaty (BIT).”88 Rather than parsing through the statute to determine whether a BIT
arbitration constitutes a “foreign or international tribunal” under 28 U.S.C. §1782, courts often
conclude that the existence of a foreign litigation is sufficient to meet the statutory
requirements.89 While this strategy has merit (since it is certainly true that the existence of
litigation in a foreign court is enough to meet the statutory test for a “foreign or international
tribunal”), the decisions often do not make it clear that they are not addressing the question of
whether an investment arbitration falls within the terms of the statute.90 As such, the cases can
be somewhat misleading.
Second, even when courts do consider whether a tribunal in an investment arbitration
constitutes a “foreign or international tribunal” under Section 1782, they typically do so in a
highly formal and conclusory manner.91 Thus, for example, at one point the Third Circuit simply
stated, without any supporting analysis or authority, that “use of the evidence uncovered in a
section 1782 application in the BIT arbitration to ‘attack’ the Lago Agrio Court unquestionably
would be ‘for a use in a proceeding in a foreign or international tribunal.’”92 Although this kind
of analytical deficiency may sometimes be the result of faulty briefing by the parties,93 it is
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In re Chevron, 650 F.3d at 279; see also In re Chevron, 633 F.3d at 163. Indeed, Chevron has
explicitly stated that it intended to use the fruits of the Section 1782 requests in both the Ecuadorian
courts and the BIT arbitration. See id. at 159.
89
See 28 U.S.C. §1782; Berlinger, 629 F.3d at 310-11; Chevron Corp., 2010 WL 4883111 at *2 n.2.
90
28 U.S.C. §1782.
91
See Alford, supra note 3, at 136, 138. But see In re Chevron, 762 F. Supp. 2d at 250; In re Veiga, 746
F. Supp. 2d at 23.
92
In re Chevron, 633 F.3d at 161; see also Republic of Ecuador v. Connor, 708 F.3d 651, 657 (5th Cir.
2013); Republic of Ecuador v. Bjorkman, 801 F. Supp. 2d 1121, 1124 (D. Colo. 2011), order aff’d, 2011
WL 5439681 (D. Colo. Nov. 9, 2011); In re Republic of Ecuador, 280 F.R.D. 506, 508 (N.D. Cal. 2012);
Chevron Corp., Nos. 1:10MC27, 1:10MC28, 2010 WL 3418394, at *4 (W.D. N.C. Aug. 30, 2010).
93
Parties sometimes fail to object to the use of a Section 1782 request in the context of an investment
arbitration. See 28 U.S.C. §1782; In re Mesa Power Group, LLC, 878 F. Supp. 2d 1296, 1302 (S.D. Fla.
2012); Bjorkman, 801 F. Supp. 2d at 1124.
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disturbing to see so many courts undertaking such a mechanical approach to important questions
of statutory interpretation.
Third, many decisions in the Chevron-Ecuador line of cases simply rely on precedents
arising out of the same factual dispute without noticing that those earlier decisions are
themselves largely unanalyzed.94 Although some courts at least indicate that they are relying on
theories such as judicial estoppel to avoid relitigating certain facts, not every court makes that
distinction.95 As a result, an ever-growing number of cases allow discovery under Section 1782
based on very sparsely reasoned precedent.96 The problem is further compounded when courts
outside the Chevron-Ecuador line of authority rely on these precedents without any sort of
independent analysis of the propriety of a Section 1782 request in a situation involving
investment arbitration.97
Fourth, many of the decisions involving Section 1782 requests in the context of the
Chevron-Ecuador dispute were made by magistrate judges rather than district judges.98 This
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See In re Chevron Corp., No. 11-24599-CV, 2012 WL 3636925, at *7 (S.D. Fla. June 12, 2012);
Bjorkman, 801 F. Supp. 2d at 1124 n.1; In re Republic of Ecuador, No. 2:11-mc-00052 GSA, 2011 WL
4089189, at *3 (E.D. Cal. Sept. 13, 2011); In re Veiga, 746 F. Supp. 2d at 22-23; In re Republic of
Ecuador, No. C-10-80225 MISC CRB (EMC), 2010 WL 3702427, at *4 (E.D. Cal. Sept. 15, 2010).
95
See Connor, 708 F.3d at 657.
96
See 28 U.S.C. §1782.
97
See id.; In re Mesa Power Group, LLC, No. 2:11-mc-280-ES, 2012 WL 6060941, at *5 (D.N.J. Nov.
20, 2012) (involving a Section 1782 request in the context of a NAFTA arbitration); In re Mesa Power,
878 F. Supp. 2d at 1302 (listing Section 1782 requests in other NAFTA and investment arbitrations).
98
See Chevron Corp. v. Salazar, 275 F.R.D. 437 (S.D.N.Y. 2011); In re Chevron, 2012 WL 3636925 at
*1; In re Republic of Ecuador, 280 F.R.D. at 508; In re Republic of Ecuador, 2011 WL 4089189 at *1;
Bjorkman, 801 F. Supp. 2d at 1122; In re Republic of Ecuador, Nos. C-10-80225 MISC CRB (EMC), C10-80324 MISC CRB (EMC), 2011 WL 736868, at *1 (N.D. Cal. Feb. 22, 2011); In re Chevron Corp.,
762 F. Supp. 2d 242, 244 (D. Mass. 2010); In re Republic of Ecuador, No. C-10-80225 MISC CRB
(EMC), 2010 WL 1782.
98
Phillips v. Beierwaltes, 466 F.3d 1217, 1222 (10th Cir. 2006); 4973492, at *8 (N.D. Cal. Dec. 1, 2010),
reconsid. denied, 2011 WL 736868 (N.D. Cal. Feb. 22, 2011); In re Republic of Ecuador, No. 1:10-mc00040 GSA, 2010 WL 4027740 (E.D. Cal. Oct. 14, 2010); In re Republic of Ecuador, 2010 WL 3702427
at *1; Chevron Corp., Nos. 10-MC-21JH/LFG, 20-MC-22 JH/LFG, 2010 WL 8786279, at *1 (D. N.M.
Sept. 1, 2010), objections overruled, 2010 WL 8786202 (D. N.M. Sept. 13, 2010); Chevron Corp., Nos.
1:10MC27, 1:10MC28, 2010 WL 3418394, at *1 (W.D. N.C. Aug. 30, 2010); In re Chevron Corp., No.
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phenomenon is potentially problematic because the scope of authority given to magistrate judges
is limited by statute and falls somewhat short of the power given to district judges under the U.S.
Constitution.99 These differences can lead to a number of difficulties in cases involving Section
1782.100
For example, several courts have rejected the view that a Section 1782 request can “be
characterized as a ‘discovery dispute’ and, as such, . . . referred to a magistrate judge without the
[other party’s] consent . . . under a blanket referral order assigning to magistrate judges all
‘discovery disputes in cases pending in other federal courts.’”101 Indeed, something of a circuit
split has arisen on this issue.102 Therefore, it is possible that a Section 1782 request may only
properly be heard by a magistrate judge if the district court enters a special direction under 28
U.S.C. §636(b)(1)(B) rather than relying solely on a standing order under 28 U.S.C.
§636(b)(1)(A).103
Questions about the proper characterization of a magistrate’s authority to hear a Section
1782 request also give rise to concerns about the appropriate standard of review of any order that

3:10-cv-00686, 2010 WL 8767266, at *1 (M.D. Tenn. Aug. 17, 2010); In re Chevron Corp., No. 1:10-MI0076-TWT-GGB, 2010 WL 8767265, at *1 (N.D. Ga. Mar. 2, 2010); see also In re Mesa Power, 2012
WL 6060941 at *1; In re Mesa Power, 878 F. Supp. 2d at 1299.
99
See U.S. CONST., art. III, §§1-2; 28 U.S.C. §636 (2013); James E. Pfander, Article I Tribunals, Article
III Courts, and the Judicial Power of the United States, 118 HARV. L. REV. 643, 765-66 (2004); Judith
Resnik, “Uncle Sam Modernizes His Justice:” Inventing the Federal District Courts of the Twentieth
Century for the District of Columbia and the Nation, 90 GEO. L. J. 607, 609, 614, 622, 627 (2002).
100
See 28 U.S.C. §1782.
101
Phillips v. Beierwaltes, 466 F.3d 1217, 1222 (10th Cir. 2006); see also In re Qwest Communications
Int’l Inc., 3:08mc93, 2008 WL 2741111, at *1-2 (W.D.N.C. July 10, 2008).
102
See Chevron Corp., Nos. 10mc21, 10mc22, 2010 WL 8786202, at *2-3 (D. N.M. Sept. 13, 2010);
Chevron Corp. v. E-Tech Int’l, No. 10cv1146-IEG(WMc), 2010 WL 3584520, at *3 (S.D. Cal. Sept. 10,
2010) (noting authority suggesting that “although discovery disputes generally are viewed as nondispositive, motions under §1782 are dispositive matters” and discussing split of authority); see also
Philips, 466 F. 3d at 122-22; Four Pillars Enterprises Co., Ltd. v. Avery Dennison Corp., 308 F.3d 1075,
1078 (9th Cir. 2002); In re Clerici, 481 F.3d 1324, 1331 (11th Cir. 2007).
103
See 28 U.S.C. §636(b)(1) (2013).
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results from such a request.104 For example, if a magistrate is considering a pretrial matter that is
subject to a standing order under 28 U.S.C. §636(b)(1)(A), then the magistrate’s decision may
only be reconsidered by the district court if the decision is “clearly erroneous or contrary to
law.”105 However, some parties have argued that de novo review of the magistrate’s order is
necessary, given that “applications for discovery under 28 U.S.C. §1782 are inherently
dispositive, and may not be ruled on by magistrate judges” absent a special direction under 28
U.S.C. §636(b)(1)(B).106
Although these matters involve the niceties of statutory interpretation, the issue can also
be placed in the context of a larger discussion about whether the excessive use of magistrate
judges “erode[s] Article III values.”107 Indeed, there are serious questions about whether and to
what extent magistrate judges can or should be involved in decisions (such as Section 1782
determinations) that have the potential to affect foreign affairs.108 Given that “legal
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See 28 U.S.C. §1782.
28 U.S.C. §636(b)(1)(A); Chevron Corp., 2010 WL 8786202 at *2 (quoting 28 U.S.C. §636(b)(1)(A)
and referring to First Union Mortgage Corp. v. Smith, 229 F.3d 992, 995 (10th Cir. 2000)); see also 28
U.S.C. §1782.
106
Chevron Corp., 2010 WL 8786202 at *2-3 (deciding “out of an abundance of caution” to review the
magistrate judge’s order de novo); see also 28 U.S.C. §636(b)(1)(b); Philips, 466 F. 3d at 122-22; E-Tech
Int’l, 2010 WL 3584520 at *3.
107
Pfander, supra note 99, at 766; see also 28 U.S.C. §636; 28 U.S.C. §1782; Resnik, supra note 99, at
609, 614, 622, 627.
108
See 28 U.S.C. §1782; see also Neil Motenko & Rebecca Shuffain, Intel v. Advanced Micro Devices:
The Court’s Permissive Approach to U.S. Discovery in Aid of Foreign Proceedings, 19 ANTITRUST 66, 69
(2004); Catherine Piché, Discovery in International Litigation, 38 INT’L LAW. 329, 330 (2004). This
issue comes up most frequently in the context of extradition. See, e.g., Prasoprat v. Benov, 421 F.3d
1009, 1017 (9th Cir. 2005) (noting “[t]he extradition magistrate simply does not have the authority to
consider foreign policy concerns and other issues that may affect the executive branch’s decision whether
to extradite”). But see John T. Parry, International Extradition, The Rule of Non-Inquiry, and The
Problem of Sovereignty, 90 B.U. L. REV. 1973, 1974-75 (2010). However, concerns have also been
raised in the context of foreign sovereign immunity disputes. See Rubin v. Islamic Repub. of Iran, 637
F.3d 783, 791 (7th Cir. 2011), cert. denied, 133 S. Ct. 23 (2012) (noting in the context of a case where the
district court adopted the magistrate judge’s positions in toto that “[q]uestions of foreign-sovereign
immunity are sensitive, and lower-court mistakes about the availability of immunity can have foreignpolicy implications”). Although no known example exists where a party has attempted to use Section
1782 to obtain evidence held by foreign state or state parties within the United States, such a possibility
105
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inconsistencies in the area of investment arbitration affect foreign investment decisions,
economic development, and foreign relations,”109 U.S. district judges should be hesitant about
allowing Section 1782 requests to be heard by magistrate judges.
These four analytical shortcomings make the Chevron-Ecuador line of cases extremely
troubling from a jurisprudential perspective. Furthermore, the vast number of decisions arising
out of this particular dispute threatens to move the law in a particular direction without any real
discussion about the propriety of judicially mandated U.S.-style discovery in investment
arbitration. This phenomenon is somewhat different from the situation involving Section 1782
requests relating to international commercial arbitration.110

C.

Post-Intel Jurisprudence Regarding International Commercial Arbitration

Section 1782 requests in the context of international commercial arbitration do not involve the
same kind of clear demarcation line that is seen in the investment context as a result of the
Chevron-Ecuador line of cases.111 Instead, jurisprudence in the commercial realm has developed
somewhat more organically. Nevertheless, there is a growing circuit split concerning whether
the statute can or should be applied to matters involving international commercial arbitration.112

exists. See Lantheus Med. Imaging, Inc. v. Zurich Am. Ins. Co., 841 F. Supp. 2d 769, 776, 782-83, 79697 (S.D.N.Y. 2012); see also infra notes 372, 374 and accompanying text.
109
Susan D. Franck, The Nature and Enforcement of Investor Rights Under Investment Treaties: Do
Investment Treaties Have a Bright Future, 12 U.C. DAVIS J. INT’L L. & POL’Y 47, 57 (2005).
110
See Alford, supra note 3, at 138.
111
See 28 U.S.C. §1782.
112
See id.; In re Consorcio Ecuatoriano de Telecomunicaciones S.A., 685 F.3d 987, 997-98 (11th Cir.
2012); In rel Winning (HK) Int’l Shipping Co. Ltd., No. 09-22659-MC, 2010 WL 1796579, at *6-7 (S.D.
Fla. Apr. 30, 2010); AAA, supra note 18, at 10; Alford, supra note 3, at 135; Beale et al., supra note 18,
at 89.
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This phenomenon suggests that the best way to introduce the existing case law in this field is to
contrast arguments for and against the use of Section 1782 requests in the commercial context.113

1.

Reasons to disallow Section 1782 requests

At this point, courts have enunciated a number of reasons why requests for discovery under
Section 1782 should be denied in cases involving international commercial arbitration.114 For
example, some courts have found that tribunals in international commercial arbitration do not
generate decisions that are judicially reviewable under the criteria described by the Supreme
Court in Intel.115 This approach is based on the recognition that it is not only “common for
arbitration provisions in private contracts to include a waiver of review by courts,”116 but that a
number of arbitration rules “provide that decisions by the arbitrators are to be treated as
administrative, and appeals to any judicial authority are generally taken to have been waived.”117
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See 28 U.S.C. §1782.
See id.; In re Finserve Group Ltd., No. 4:11–mc–2044–RBH, 2011 WL 5024264 (D. S.C. Oct 20,
2011); In re Rhodianyl S.A.S., No. 11-1026-JTM, 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 72918, at *43 (D. Kan. Mar.
25, 2011); In re Norfolk Southern Corp., 626 F. Supp. 2d 882, 883–86 (N.D. Ill. 2009); In re Operadora
DB Mexico, S.A., No. 6:09-cv-383-Orl-22GJK, 2009 WL 2423138, at *8–12 (M.D. Fla. Aug. 4, 2009);
La Comision Ejecutiva Hidroelecctrica Del Rio Lempa v. El Paso Corp., 617 F. Supp. 2d 481, 485–87
(S.D. Tex. 2008), aff’d, 341 Fed. App’x 31 (5th Cir. 2009); Alford, supra note 3, at 135.
115
See 28 U.S.C. §1782; Intel Corp. v. Advanced Micro Devices, Inc., 542 U.S. 241 (2004); In re
Operadora, 2009 WL 2423138 at *12 (involving an arbitral award rendered in an arbitration with the
International Chamber of Commerce); see also W. LAURENCE CRAIG ET AL., INTERNATIONAL CHAMBER
OF COMMERCE ARBITRATION (2001).
116
In re Finserve, 2011 WL 5024264 at *3; see also Ex rel Winning, 2010 WL 1796579 at *9; Norfolk
Southern, 626 F. Supp. 2d at 886.
117
In re Finserve, 2011 WL 5024264, at *3 (referring to the Arbitration Rules of the London Court of
International Arbitration (LCIA)); In re Norfolk Southern, 626 F. Supp. 2d at 886. However, if the
governing law permits review on the merits or the governing arbitral rules permit disclosure of the type
contemplated by Section 1782, then the arbitral tribunal may be considered to fall within the scope of the
statute. See In re Finserve, 2011 WL 5024264, at *10.
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Thus, “the emphasis in Intel on judicial reviewability – not simply enforceability – prevent[s]
application of §1782 in the case of purely private arbitrations.”118
Other courts have noted that “the crucial requirement [under Intel] is that the foreign
body exercise adjudicative power, and have an adjudicative purpose.”119 This approach requires
courts considering requests under Section 1782 to determine whether arbitration is an alternative
to or the equivalent of litigation.120 This is a relatively thorny issue that has not yet been fully
resolved even outside the context of Section 1782.121
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In re Rhodianyl, 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 72918 at *30; see also In re Norfolk Southern, 626 F. Supp.
2d at 886. Interestingly, the focus on judicial reviewability could perhaps allow Section 1782 requests to
proceed if an arbitration is seated in a country that allows judicial review of the merits of an arbitral
award. See In re Rhodianyl, 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 72918 at *41-42 (discussing Ex rel Winning, 2010
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237, 239-41.
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625, 629 (N.D. Cal. 1973) (footnote omitted), aff’d, 488 F.2d 511, 512 (9th Cir. 1973); see also Intel, 542
U.S. at 241.
120
See 28 U.S.C. §1782.
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See id.; LARRY E. EDMONSON, DOMKE ON COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION §1:1, at 1-3 (2010) (noting
arbitration coexists with litigation as “part of the American system of administering justice”); id. §1:3, at
1-8 to 1-9 (indicating that early precedent distinguished between commercial arbitration as a substitute for
litigation and labor arbitration as a substitute for avoiding industrial strife, but suggesting that these
distinctions may no longer apply); Cindy G. Buys, The Arbitrators’ Duty to Respect the Parties’ Choice
of Law in Commercial Arbitration, 79 ST. JOHN’S L. REV. 59, 93-94 (2005) (noting differences between
arbitration and litigation); Pierre Mayer, Comparative Analysis of Power of Arbitrators to Determine
Procedures in Civil and Common Law Systems, ICCA CONG. SER. NO. 7, 24, 26 (1996) (noting
arbitration is sometimes considered “a substitute for State justice, albeit of a private nature, but
nevertheless pursuing the same ends”); Jeffrey W. Stempel, Keeping Arbitrations From Becoming
Kangaroo Courts, 8 NEV. L.J. 251, 260 (2007) (noting “arbitration is a substitute for adjudication by
litigation”); Jean R. Sternlight, Creeping Mandatory Arbitration: Is It Just?, 57 STAN. L. REV. 1631, 1673
(2005) (concluding arbitration is not the same as litigation); Strong, First Principles, supra note 32, at
241-45 (discussing the nature of arbitration).
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Although further research on the theoretical nature of arbitration is warranted, courts
facing discovery requests under Section 1782 have nevertheless had to address the issue as a
practical manner.122 Those courts that disallow requests under Section 1782 tend to characterize
international commercial arbitration as “function[ing] as a contractual alternative to statesponsored courts, administrative agencies, arbitral tribunals, and quasi-judicial bodies.”123 This
approach allows courts to distinguish international commercial arbitration from the type of
procedure discussed in Intel on the grounds
that the D-G Commission acted as a quasi-adjudicative proceeding before review
by true judiciary powers makes it an animal of a very different stripe from an
arbitral tribunal. An arbitral tribunal exists as a parallel source of decisionmaking to, and is entirely separate from, the judiciary, which was not the case
with the D-G Competition as the Court was at pains to point out in Intel.124
Under this analysis, international commercial arbitration does not constitute a “foreign or
international tribunal” within the meaning of Section 1782.125
The emphasis on the contractual aspects of international commercial arbitration is
important not only as a means of distinguishing litigation and arbitration on what might be called
jurisdictional grounds,126 but also as a way of identifying the parties’ procedural expectations.
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See 28 U.S.C. §1782.
In re Operadora DB Mexica, S.A. de C.V., No. 6:09-cv-383-Orl-22GJK, 2009 WL 2423138, at *12
(M.D. Fla. Aug. 4, 2009); see also 28 U.S.C. §1782; Intel, 542 U.S. at 241. However, the holding in
Operadora is somewhat suspect, given the Eleventh Circuit’s recent decision in In re Consorcio
Ecuatoriano de Telecomunicaciones S.A., 685 F.3d 987, 997-98 (11th Cir. 2012); see Operadora, 2009
WL 2423138 at *3 (noting the Eleventh Circuit had not yet addressed the issue).
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La Comision Ejecutiva Hidroelectrica Del Rio Lempa v. El Paso Corp., 617 F. Supp. 2d 481, 485–86
(S.D. Tex. 2008), aff’d, 341 Fed. App’x 31 (5th Cir. 2009); see also infra notes 315-23and accompanying
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Thus, “in a private arbitral proceeding, a party’s ‘tactical use of discovery devices’ such as
§1782 may deprive the other party of ‘its bargained-for efficient process.’”127 Indeed, it has been
generally accepted that the rules and procedures in arbitration are intended to be
radically different from the rules and procedures in the courts. Arbitrators govern
their own proceedings, generally without assistance or intervention by a court.
Whether or not there is to be pre-hearing discovery is a matter governed by the
applicable arbitration rules (as distinct from court rules) and by what the
arbitrators decide. . . . [A] Federal District Court has no power to order discovery
under court rules where the matter is being litigated in an arbitration.128
Another way of analyzing the propriety of Section 1782 in cases involving international
commercial arbitration involves a direct attack on Intel’s precedential power.129 Indeed,
as conceded by almost all of the post-Intel rulings, the Supreme Court in Intel
never addressed the issue of whether a private arbitration forum qualified as a
tribunal under section 1782. In addition, the tribunal in Intel was not chosen
pursuant to a written agreement between the parties to settle their disputes through
private arbitration, but rather was initiated by the unilateral submission of a
complaint by a competitor of one of the parties. Finally, the entity in Intel in
which the complaint was filed was a quasi-governmental body charged with
enforcing and investigating violations of certain European Union anti-trust
laws.130
As a result, “the Supreme Court in Intel did not have cause to address any distinctions
between private or quasi-governmental entities for purposes of section 1782, because there was
no non-governmental or nonstate-sponsored body at issue in that case.”131 Jurisdictions adopting
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2011) (quoting Nat’l Broad. Co. v. Bear Sterns & Co., Inc., 165 F.3d 184, 191 (2d Cir. 1998)); see also
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See 28 U.S.C. §1782; Intel Corp. v. Advanced Micro Devices, Inc., 542 U.S. 241 (2004).
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30, 2010); see also In re Roz Trading Ltd., 469 F. Supp. 2d 1221, 1224 (N.D. Ga. 2006).
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Ex rel Winning, 2010 WL 1796579 at *7.
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this line of analysis typically follow the approach to Section 1782 used in that circuit prior to
Intel.132
When considering whether to extend Section 1782 to situations involving international
commercial arbitration, courts sometimes find it useful to think about the effect that decision
might have.133 The Fifth Circuit has expressly addressed this issue, noting
that §1782 authorizes broader discovery than what is authorized for domestic
arbitrations by Federal Arbitration Act §7. If §1782 were to apply to private
international arbitrations, “the differences in available discovery could ‘create an
entirely new category of disputes concerning the appointment of arbitrators and
the characterization of arbitration disputes as domestic, foreign, or international.’”
. . . [E]mpowering parties in international arbitrations to seek ancillary discovery
through federal courts could [also] destroy arbitration’s principal advantage as “a
speedy, economical, and effective means of dispute resolution” if the parties
“succumb to fighting over burdensome discovery requests far from the place of
arbitration.” Neither private arbitration nor these questions were at issue in
Intel.134

2.

Reasons to allow Section 1782 requests

Although a variety of courts have decided not to allow discovery under Section 1782 in cases
involving international commercial arbitration, some authorities take the opposite view.135
Unfortunately, in-depth discussion of a number of these decisions is virtually impossible, since
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Int’l, 168 F.3d 880 (5th Cir. 2009)).
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241; In re Rhodianyl S.A.S., No. 11-1026-JTM, 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 72918, at *31 (D. Kan. Mar. 25,
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note 3, at 136.
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2877156, at *2-5 (D. Conn. Aug. 27, 2009); In re Babcock Borsig AG, 583 F. Supp. 2d 233, 237-40 (D.
Mass. 2008); In re Hallmark Capital Corp., 534 F. Supp. 2d 951, 953–57 (D. Minn. 2007); In re Roz, 469
F. Supp. 2d at 1223–28; Alford, supra note 3, at 135; Beale et al., supra note 18, at 69-89.
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the opinions either exhibit the same kind of conclusory analysis that was evident in the
investment context136 or reflect a fundamental misunderstanding of the relationship between
courts and arbitration.137 These types of precedents are problematic not only for those who are
involved in the proceeding at bar but also for parties to subsequent disputes, since other courts
may unwittingly rely on inadequate or incorrect propositions of law.
For the most part, courts that consider Section 1782 requests to be appropriate in the
context of international commercial arbitration base their decisions on Intel.138 While some
decisions in this line of cases are unhelpfully superficial,139 the more rigorous analyses focus on
the so-called “functionality test,” which “involves an analytical framework pursuant to which
courts look beyond the narrow categorisation of whether an international arbitration proceeding
is ‘private’ (eg, unrelated to treaties) and assess the specific character or function of the
arbitration in the broader legal system in which the arbitration is seated.”140 Under this
approach, courts “consider the origin of [the tribunal’s] decisionmaking authority and its
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See 28 U.S.C. §1782.
For example, at least one court has confused the issue of a separate jurisdictional challenge to
arbitration with the concept of judicial review of the arbitral award. See Ukrnafta, 2009 WL 2877156 at
*4. Although the parties may challenge the jurisdiction of the arbitral tribunal during post-hearing
enforcement proceedings, the issue in Ukrnafta was raised at the initial stage of the dispute and therefore
reflects a very different procedural posture. See id.; STRONG, supra note 67, at 31-32 (noting courts may
become involved before, during and after an arbitral proceeding).
138
See 28 U.S.C. §1782; Intel, 542 U.S. at 241; Ex rel Winning (HK) Shipping Co. Ltd., No. 09-22659,
2010 WL 1796579, at *7 (S.D. Fla. Apr. 30, 2010; In re Roz, 469 F. Supp. 2d at 1228.
139
For example, a number of courts move immediately to the discretionary analysis without undertaking
any real discussion of the meaning of a “foreign or international tribunal” under the statute. See 28
U.S.C. §1782; In re Broadsheet L.L.C., No. 11–cv–02436–PAB–KMT, 2011 WL 4949864, at *2 (D.
Colo. Oct. 18, 2011); Government of Ghana v. ProEnergy Services, L.L.C., No. 11-9002-MC-SOW, 2011
WL 2652755, at *3 (W.D. Mo. June 6, 2011). Other courts simply rely on the broad language of Intel to
justify extension of Section 1782 to international commercial arbitration. See 28 U.S.C. §1782; Intel, 542
U.S. at 241; In re Babcock Borsig, 583 F. Supp. 2d at 237–40; In re Hallmark, 534 F. Supp. 2d at 953–57;
In re Roz, 469 F. Supp. 2d at 1226.
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Lamelas, supra note 18, at 155; see also Intel, 542 U.S. at 241; Ex rel Winning, 2010 WL 1796579 at
*7; In re Roz, 469 F. Supp. 2d at 1228.
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purpose”141 and may “extend[] §1782 to private arbitrations where the arbitrations function as
first-instance decision making proceedings that are subject to substantive court review,
analogous to the Directorate General in the Intel case.”142
There are some problems with this approach. For example,
the criteria adopted by Supreme Court for its functional analysis in Intel were
based, in part, on the particular characteristics of the DG-Competition and the
European Commission. The Supreme Court did not consider whether additional
criteria would be relevant if it were to consider a different kind of proceeding.
For example, . . . the DG-Competition and European Commission were, without
question, state-sponsored. Thus, the Supreme Court did not consider whether the
source of the proceeding’s authority to issue binding decisions or its purpose are
relevant criteria.143
Furthermore, one of the major elements of the functionality test is the reviewability of the
decision rendered by the purported foreign or international tribunal.144 However, courts that
allow Section 1782 requests in cases involving international commercial arbitration do not
require judicial review in arbitration to operate in precisely the same manner as appellate review
in litigation.145 Instead, courts reject the view “that the functional requirement of being subject
to judicial review is only satisfied when the sum and substance of the arbitral body’s decision is
subject to full judicial reconsideration on the merits,” claiming that that standard is “far too
stringent.”146 Instead, the functionality test is said to involve “the common sense understanding
that an arbitral award is subject to judicial review when a court can enforce the award or can
141

In re Rhodianyl S.A.S., No. 11-1026-JTM, 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 72918, at *38 (D. Kan. Mar. 25,
2011) (quoting In re Operadora DB Mexico, S.A., No. 6:09-cv-383-Orl-22GJK, 2009 WL 2423138, at
*12 (M.D. Fla. Aug. 4, 2009)).
142
Lamelas, supra note 18, at 155; see also Intel, 542 U.S. at 264; In re Consorcio Ecuatoriano de
Telecomunicaciones S.A., 685 F.3d 987 (11th Cir. 2012); Ex rel Winning, 2010 WL 1796579 at *7; In re
Operadora, 2009 WL 2423138 at *11-12; AAA, supra note 18, at 10; Alford, supra note 3, at 135;
Lamelas, supra note 18, at 155-56.
143
In re Rhodianyl, 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 72918 at *38-39 (quoting Operadora, 2009 WL 2423138 at
*12).
144
See Intel, 542 U.S. at 255.
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See In re Consorcio Ecuatoriano, 685 F.3d at 996-97.
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Id.
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upset it on the basis of defects in the arbitration proceeding or in other limited circumstances.”147
This conclusion is based on the notion that “[o]ne could not seriously argue that, because
domestic arbitration awards are only reviewable in court for limited reasons (notably excluding a
second look at the substance of the arbitral determination), this amounts to no judicial review at
all.”148

III.

Distinguishing International Commercial Arbitration and International Investment
Arbitration in Section 1782 Analyses

Functional analyses (such as those purportedly required by Intel) can be quite useful in
overcoming superficial differences between different legal systems.149 However, proper
application of a functional methodology requires a profound understanding of the various legal
systems at issue.150 This requirement can create some problems in cases involving international
arbitration, since people who do not specialize in the field often experience difficulties in
distinguishing between the various types of procedures.151 Particular problems arise in situations
involving international commercial and investment arbitration, since
[t]he two forms of arbitration are similar in that both allow a private party to bring
a claim before a tribunal, the members of which are appointed by the disputing
parties rather than a public authority. Also, the proceedings are governed by rules
originating in private arbitration, and the professional backgrounds of many
arbitrators are in the area of commercial law. . . . Finally, rules of arbitration and
domestic law typically call for courts to show deference to arbitration awards in
Id.; In re Roz, 469 F. Supp. 2d at 1228 (“Where a body makes adjudicative decisions responsive to a
complaint and reviewable in court, it falls within the widely accepted definition of ‘tribunal,’ the
reasoning of Intel, and the scope of § 1782(a), regardless of whether the body is governmental or
private.”).
148
In re Consorcio Ecuatoriano, 685 F.3d at 996.
149
See Intel, 542 U.S. at 241; Ralf Michaels, The Functional Method of Comparative Law, in THE
OXFORD HANDBOOK OF COMPARATIVE LAW 339, 357 (Mathias Reiman & Reinhard Zimmerman eds.,
2006).
150
See Michaels, supra note 149, at 342.
151
See LEW ET AL., supra note 22, ¶¶28-8 to 28-13; MCLACHLAN ET AL., supra note 7, ¶¶1.10-1.15;
STRONG, supra note 67, at 2-7.
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order to promote stability and predictability in the use of arbitration in
international commerce.152
However, these similarities have been said to focus more on form than on substance,
thereby leaving room for a more rigorous analysis of certain functional concerns.153 The
following subsections attempt to fill the analytical lacuna by considering two issues – grants of
jurisdiction and state interests – that have been largely ignored by both courts and commentators,
even though such matters have been said to be central to Intel’s functionality test.154 This section
also addresses a third issue that has never apparently been considered in Section 1782
proceedings, namely the use of various interpretive canons relating to potential conflicts between
domestic and international law.155

A.

Grant of Jurisdiction

According to Intel, U.S. courts are to “consider the origin of [the tribunal’s] decisionmaking
authority and its purpose” when considering whether the entity in question constitutes a “foreign
or international tribunal” under Section 1782.156 However, the Supreme Court did not discuss
issues relating to the source of the tribunal’s adjudicatory capability in any detail in Intel, since
the entities in question were all clearly associated with the European Union, a quasi-state
152

Van Harten, supra note 23, at 377-78; see also Tomoko Ishikawa, Third Party Participation in
Investment Treaty Arbitration, 69 INT’L & COMP. L. Q. 373, 373 (2010) (describing investment arbitration
as a “‘hybrid,’ because while the jurisdiction of tribunals and the standards of protection are based on
investment treaties between States, it incorporates or uses the procedural rules of international
commercial arbitration”).
153
See van Harten, supra note 23, at 377-78. Further reading is available regarding the differences
between international commercial and investment arbitration. See LEW ET AL., supra note 22, ¶¶28-8 to
28-13; MCLACHLAN ET AL., supra note 7, ¶¶1.10-1.15.
154
See 28 U.S.C. §1782; Intel Corp. v. Advanced Micro Devices, Inc., 542 U.S. 241, 258 (2004); see also
supra notes 156-438 and accompanying text.
155
See 28 U.S.C. §1782 (2013) ; see also supra notes 439-54 and accompanying text.
156
In re Rhodianyl S.A.S., No. 11-1026-JTM, 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 72918, at *38 (D. Kan. Mar. 25,
2011); see also 28 U.S.C. §1782; Intel, 542 U.S. at 258. Lower courts are also sometimes admonished to
look past the public-private distinction. See Lamelas, supra note 18, at 155; see also Intel, 542 U.S. at
241; Ex rel Winning, 2010 WL 1796579 at *7; In re Roz, 469 F. Supp. 2d at 1228.
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entity.157 This analytical gap has created some problems for courts considering Section 1782 in
cases involving international commercial and investment arbitration, thereby making further
study of issues relating to grants of jurisdiction both necessary and appropriate.158 Before
considering grants of jurisdiction in these two forms of arbitration, however, it is useful to
consider grants of jurisdiction in other types of national and international proceedings so as to set
the foundation for further analysis.

1. Grants of jurisdiction in litigation and first generation international tribunals
Most judges, having spent most, if not all, of their careers in a litigation environment, consider
litigation to constitute the paradigmatic model for dispute resolution.159 As a result, most courts
considering jurisdictional grants in Section 1782 proceedings will probably analyze matters from
a litigation perspective.160 At this point, this approach does not appear to be unduly problematic,
since there is no question that litigation in a foreign court falls within the definition of a
“proceeding in a foreign or international tribunal” under Section 1782.161 However, the judicial
predisposition toward litigation as the default norm suggests the need to establish the parameters
of jurisdictional grants in litigation so as to better understand the dynamics involved in
international commercial and investment arbitration.

157

See In re Rhodianyl, 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 72918, at *38-39; In re Operadora DB Mexico, S.A., No.
6:09-cv-383-Orl-22GJK, 2009 WL 2423138, at *12 (M.D. Fla. Aug. 4, 2009); Tom Ginsburg & Eric
Posner, Subconstitutionalism, 62 STAN. L. REV. 1583, 1595 (2010); see also Intel, 542 U.S. at 258.
158
See 28 U.S.C. §1782; see supra notes 26-148 and accompanying text.
159
See Wayne D. Brazil, The Adversary Character of Civil Discovery: A Critique and Proposals for
Change, 31 VAND. L. REV. 1295, 1343 (1978). Hence, other methods of resolving disputes – be they
arbitration, mediation or something else – are typically labeled as “alternative” in nature.
160
See 28 U.S.C. §1782.
161
Id.; see also Alford, supra note 3, at 132.
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The first thing to note is that grants of jurisdiction to national courts arise as a matter of
constitutional law and are considered to be quintessentially sovereign acts.162 However, a state’s
right to grant jurisdiction over legal disputes to its national courts is not inconsistent with the
ability of private actors to accept jurisdiction over certain matters in both arbitration and
mediation.163 Indeed, private arbitration has long been considered a legitimate dispute resolution
device in the United States, dating back to the time when the Constitution was first adopted.164
Grants of jurisdiction in arbitration differ somewhat from grants of jurisdiction in
litigation. Some aspects of a jurisdictional grant in arbitration are state-initiated and therefore
sovereign in nature, even though the matter may not necessarily rise to the constitutional level.165
Instead, state authorization of arbitration is typically found in legislation identifying whether and
to what extent arbitration is permitted within the territory of the state.166
162

See U.S. CONST., art. III, §§1-2; J. McIntyre Mach., Ltd. v. Nicastro, 131 S. Ct. 2780, 2789 (2011)
(noting “jurisdiction is in the first instance a question of authority rather than fairness”); Born,
Adjudication, supra note 23, at 871; John T. Parry, Introduction: Due Process, Borders, and the
Qualities of Sovereignty – Some Thoughts on J. McIntyre Machinery v. Nicastro, 16 LEWIS & CLARK L.
REV. 827, 861-63 (2012); Stephen E. Sachs, Constitutional Backdrops, 80 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1813,
1872-76 (2012); van Harten, supra note 23, at 373, 376.
163
See van Harten, supra note 23, at 373-75. One way of considering this phenomenon is to conclude
that arbitration and litigation hold concurrent jurisdiction over certain matters, similar to the arrangement
between U.S. state and federal courts. See infra notes 315-23 and accompanying text [re concurrent.
164
See Carli N. Conklin, Lost Options for Mutual Gain? The Lawyer, the Layperson, and Dispute
Resolution in Early America, 29 OHIO ST. J. DISP. RESOL. __ (forthcoming 2013); Carli N. Conklin,
Transformed, Not Transcended: The Role of Extrajudicial Dispute Resolution in Antebellum Kentucky
and New Jersey, 48 AM. J. LEGAL HIST. 39 (2006); David Horton, The Federal Arbitration Act and
Testamentary Instruments, 90 N.C. L. REV. 1027, 1035 (2012) (noting George Washington himself used
an arbitration provision in his will).
165
However, some legal systems view arbitration as a constitutional right. See COLOM. CONST., art. 116;
LEW ET AL., supra note 22, ¶¶5-2 to 5-5; PETER B. RUTLEDGE, ARBITRATION AND THE CONSTITUTION 2
(2013); S.I. Strong, International Arbitration and the Republic of Colombia: Commercial, Comparative
and Constitutional Concerns From a U.S. Perspective, 22 DUKE J. COMP. & INT’L L. 47, 62 (2011).
Furthermore, any legislative grant of authority to arbitration must comply with any applicable
constitutional principles. See RUTLEDGE, supra, at 4-5.
166
See David C. Caron, The Nature of the Iran-United States Claims Tribunal and the Evolving Structure
of International Dispute Resolution, 84 AM. J. INT’L L. 104, 114-15 (1990); see also W. Michael Reisman
& Heide Iravani, The Changing Relation of National Courts and International Commercial Arbitration,
21 AM. REV. INT’L ARB. 5, 5-6 (2010). Many jurisdictions describe what constitutes an arbitrable dispute
in their arbitration statute. See BORN, supra note 29, at 775-89. Although the United States does not
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Although the state must provide some sort of formal authority for arbitration, arbitral
proceedings cannot arise only as a result of sovereign acts.167 Instead, individual parties must
also agree to refer a particular matter to arbitration.168 Jurisdictional grants in arbitration
therefore involve two separate but equally necessary elements: public (state) authority as well as
private (individual) consent.169 Thus, it has been said that
[w]here parties agree to submit their differences for decision by a third party, the
decision maker does not exercise judicial power, but a power of private
arbitration. Of its nature, judicial power is a power that is exercised
independently of the consent of the person against whom the proceedings are
brought and results in a judgment or order that is binding of its own force. In the
case of private arbitration, however, the arbitrator’s powers depend on the
agreement of the parties, usually embodied in a contract, and the arbitrator’s
award is not binding of its own force. Rather, its effect, if any, depends on the
law which operates with respect to it.170

include such provisions in its national arbitration statute (the Federal Arbitration Act, or FAA), the
boundaries of arbitrability are well-defined as a matter of statutory and common law. See 9 U.S.C. §§1307 (2013); BORN, supra note 29, at 789. Furthermore, the FAA reflects a strong pro-arbitration policy
that is used to guide courts considering the outer boundaries of arbitrability. See 9 U.S.C. §§1-307;
BORN, supra note 29, at 781-85.
167
Even so-called “court mandated” arbitration is voluntary. See ELIZABETH PLAPINGER & DONNA
STIENSTRA, ADR AND SETTLEMENT IN THE FEDERAL DISTRICT COURTS: A SOURCEBOOK FOR JUDGES &
LAWYERS 4 (1996). Delaware has recently run afoul of the constitutional distinction between arbitration
and litigation. See Del. Coalition for Open Gov’t v. Strine, 894 F. Supp. 2d 493, 499-503 (D. Del. 2012)
(distinguishing the two processes); John W. Joyce, Private Arbitrations Ruled Unconstitutional:
Delaware Chancery Court Procedure Violates First Amendment, 38 LIT. NEWS 12, 12 (Spring 2013).
The case is on appeal to the Third Circuit. See Del. Coalition for Open Gov’t, Inc. v. Strine, No. 12-3859
(3d Cir. 2012).
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See Rent–A–Center, West, Inc. v. Jackson, 130 S. Ct. 2772, 2776 (2010) (noting the “fundamental
principle that arbitration is a matter of contract”); BORN, supra note 29, at 90; Strine, 2012 WL 3744718
at *6-10. The voluntariness of arbitration has become somewhat suspect in recent years, at least in some
contexts. See Thomas J. Stipanowich, Arbitration: The “New” Litigation, 2010 U. ILL. L. REV. 1, 3 n.5,
49 (2010) [hereinafter Stipanowich, Litigation]; see also STRONG, supra note 67, at 2-7 (distinguishing
international commercial arbitration from other types of arbitration).
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This approach has been considered constitutional in the United States and elsewhere. See TCL Air
Conditioner (Zhongshan) Co. Ltd. v. Fed. Court of Austl., [2013] HCA 5, ¶29 (2013); RUTLEDGE, supra
note 165, at 9-11; S.I. Strong, Constitutional Conundrums in Arbitration, 15 CARDOZO J. CONFLICT
RESOL. __ (forthcoming 2013) [hereinafter Strong, Constitutional Conundrums].
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Although the ability to provide and control litigation is exclusively associated with the
sovereign, a state’s adjudicatory powers are not limitless.171 For example, a court’s authority
over a particular matter may be curtailed by other fundamental values, such as liberty interests.172
Full exercise of a court’s adjudicative powers may also be constrained by the litigants
themselves. Indeed, states give parties a considerable amount of latitude in procedural matters,
even if the parties’ decisions would exclude the jurisdiction or authority of the court in some
manner.173 For example, parties may choose the court in which a dispute is to be heard or the
law which is to govern resolution of that dispute.174 Parties may also waive litigation of a
particular substantive matter through a release or covenant not to sue, or waive certain
procedural rights, including their constitutional right to a jury.175
States may also limit their sovereign power voluntarily, as through contract, waiver or
other means.176 Although treaties and other interstate agreements are perhaps the most wellknown means by which a state relinquishes its ability to act autonomously, other types of
agreements will also suffice.177 Thus, for example, a state can lose its sovereign immunity
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See Sachs, supra note 162, at 1872-76.
See J. McIntyre Mach., Ltd. v. Nicastro, 131 S. Ct. 2780, 2789 (2011) (noting “[p]ersonal jurisdiction .
. . restricts ‘judicial power not as a matter of sovereignty, but as a matter of individual liberty’” (quoting
Ins. Corp. of Ir. v. Compagnie des Bauxites de Guinee, 456 U.S. 694, 702 (1982)).
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See Robert G. Bone, Party Rulemaking: Making Procedural Rules Through Party Choice, 90 TEX. L.
REV. 1329, 1362-67 (2012); Kevin E. Davis & Helen Hershkoff, Contracting for Procedure, 53 WM. &
MARY L. REV. 507, 520-64 (2011); Jaime Dodge, The Limits of Private Procedural Ordering, 97 VA. L.
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held enforceable in arbitration. See AT&T Mobility LLC v. Concepcion, 131 S. Ct. 1740, 1753 (2011);
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Reaseguros, S.A. v. M/V Sky Reefer, 515 U.S. 528, 537-38 (1995); The Bremen v. Zapata Off–Shore
Co., 407 U.S. 1, 12 (1972).
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See 28 U.S.C. §1605(a) (2013); 28 U.S.C. §1605A (2013).
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172

38

through adherence to an arbitration agreement, either in the commercial realm178 or in the
investment realm.179 States can also agree to waive their sovereign immunity in disputes heard
by international bodies such as the International Court of Justice (ICJ), the International Criminal
Court (ICC) and the ECJ.180
Although treaties establishing “first generation international tribunals” such as the ICJ,
the ICC and the ECJ are often viewed as primarily involving a surrender of sovereign
immunity,181 the more important aspect of these types of international agreements for the
purposes of this Article involves principles relating to jurisdictional grants. Essentially, these
agreements remove a certain subset of issues and concerns from the jurisdiction of the national
courts of the signatory states and give those matters to the international tribunal.182 In some
cases the jurisdiction of the international tribunal is exclusive, while in other instances it is
overlapping with that of the national courts.183 This phenomenon is intriguing, since it suggests
that grants of jurisdiction need not be tied to an assertion of physical power over a particular
territory (as is the case with national courts) but can instead be established by the voluntary

Administrative Ordering in an Era of Globalization and Privatization: Reflections on Sources of
Legitimation in the Post-Westphalian Polity, 32 CARDOZO L. REV. 2339, 2354 (2011).
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See Oona Hathaway & Scott J. Shapiro, Outcasting: Enforcement in Domestic and International Law,
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European Union, Sept. 5, 2008, 2010 O.J. (C 83) 47, 157, 159-67 [hereinafter ECJ Statute]; Rome Statute
of the International Criminal Court, U.N. Doc. A/CONF.183/9, 2187 U.N.T.S. 38544 (July 17, 1998)
[hereinafter ICC Statute]; Statute of the International Court of Justice, June 26, 1945, 59 Stat. 1055, 3
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supra note 180, arts. 1, 34-38; U.N. CHARTER, arts. 92-96; Born, Adjudication, supra note 23, at 794,
803-08, 871.
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See Joost Pauwelyn & Luiz Eduardo Salles, Forum Shopping Before International Tribunals: (Real)
Concerns, (Impossible) Solutions, 42 CORNELL INT’L L. J. 77, 80 (2009).
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agreement of two or more sovereign states.184 Furthermore, the existence of concurrent
jurisdiction between first generation tribunals and national courts suggests that jurisdiction need
not be exclusive to be legitimate.185
Although first generation international tribunals are created through certain sovereign
acts and therefore obtain their grant of jurisdiction from the same source as national courts,
international tribunals are unlike national courts in that the tribunals’ jurisdiction is created by
international agreements rather than through constitutional means. First generation international
tribunals also differ from national courts with respect to the substantive law that is applied in that
particular venue. For example, while both types of adjudicatory bodies can determine issues
arising under international law, only national courts can provide binding determinations of
matters of national law.186
Despite these distinctions, first generation international tribunals such as the ICJ, the ICC
and the ECJ nevertheless resemble national litigation in several potentially important ways. For
example, first generation international tribunals feature a standing set of judges187 and adhere to
a pre-existing set of procedural rules that are not amenable to amendment by the parties.188 Both
features are also typical of litigation in national courts.189
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See 28 U.S.C. §1782 (2013); Born, Adjudication, supra note 23, at 794-818; Anne Orford, Jurisdiction
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40

Furthermore, first generation tribunals also physically resemble national courts to the
extent that the international tribunals are based in a single location and are formally housed in
particular buildings that often convey the majesty of the law.190 Although this phenomenon
could be dismissed as “mere” symbolism, there may be something more substantive at work.
For example, “[t]he common law defines a court to be a ‘place where justice is judicially
administered,’ and therefore to constitute a court there must be a place appointed by law for the
administration of justice, and some person authorized by law to administer justice at that place,
must be used for that purpose.”191 Indeed, it has been said that “manifold mischiefs . . . might
arise from permitting a court to assume a migratory character and travel from place to place in
the same locality or even in the same town.”192
By adopting certain attributes of national courts, first generation international tribunals
are consciously choosing to present themselves as a type of judicial mechanism in both name and
deed.193 As a result, first generation international tribunals such as the ICJ, the ICC and the ECJ
would likely fall within the statutory parameters of Section 1782.194 This conclusion is
warranted not only as a result of the many similarities between national courts and first
generation international tribunals, particularly with respect to the source of authority for the
relevant grant of jurisdiction, but also because most of these first generation international
cij.org/documents/index.php? p1=4&p2=3&p3=0; Rules of Procedure of the [European] Court of Justice,
available at http://curia.europa.eu/jcms/upload/docs/application/pdf/2008-09/txt5_2008-09-25_17-3327_904.pdf.
189
See FED. R. CIV. P.
190
Although the use of a courthouse may seem to be a somewhat superficial element, such techniques
symbolize the formal power of the law as well as its public nature. See The Hon. Rhesa Hawkins
Barksdale, The Role of Civility in Appellate Advocacy, 50 S.C. L. REV. 573, 580 (1999); John Gill,
County Seat of Justice, 33 ARK. LAW. 24, 24-27 (Spring 1998).
191
Mell v. State, 202 S.W. 33, 33 (1918) (citation omitted)).
192
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be chosen by the parties. See LEW ET AL., supra note 22, ¶¶8-24 to 8-27.
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194
See 28 U.S.C. §1782 (2013).
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tribunals were in existence at the time Section 1782 was revised to include its broad statutory
reference to “foreign or international tribunals.”195
However, there is one other type of first generation international tribunal that needs to be
considered, namely interstate arbitration.196 Interstate arbitration has been in existence for
centuries and was indeed the primary means by which states resolved international disputes prior
to the advent of institutions such as the ICJ, the ECJ and the ICC.197 Grants of jurisdiction in
interstate arbitration are similar to grants of jurisdiction in other types of first generation
international tribunals, in that the arbitrators obtain their adjudicatory power as a result of an
international agreement between the states parties to the dispute.198 However, arbitral tribunals
differ from other sorts of first generation international tribunals in that arbitrators’ grants of
jurisdiction typically relate to a single existing dispute rather than to a category of claims that
may arise in the future.199
Interstate arbitration also differs from other types of first generation international
tribunals with respect to some of the indicia of litigation. For example, arbitrators in interstate
proceedings are selected on an individualized, ad hoc basis, while judges in national courts and
195

See ECJ Statute, supra note 180, art. 1 (noting the European Union replaced the European Community,
which was established in 1945); U.N. CHARTER, arts. 92-96 (establishing the ICJ in 1945, when the
United Nations was established); see also 28 U.S.C. §1782.
196
See Born, Adjudication, supra note 23, at 795-800. In the context of this discussion, “interstate
arbitration” excludes arbitration arising out of investment or trade disputes. See infra note 204 and
accompanying text.
197
See BORN, supra note 29, at 8-15; Born, Adjudication, supra note 23, at 800-18; see also Hague
Convention for the Pacific Settlement of International Disputes, arts. 37-90, 36 Stat. 2199, Treaty Ser.
No. 536 (1907) [hereinafter 1907 Hague Convention]; Convention for the Pacific Settlement of
International Disputes, arts. 15-57, July 29, 1899, 32 Stat. 1779, 1788, 1 Bevans 230, 237 [hereinafter
1899 Hague Convention].
198
See Born, Adjudication, supra note 23, at 795-800; see also 1907 Hague Convention, supra note 197,
arts. 37-90; 1899 Hague Convention, supra note 197, arts. 15-57.
199
See 1907 Hague Convention, supra note 197, arts. 42-46; 1899 Hague Convention, supra note 197, art.
31; Tom Ginsburg & Richard H. McAdams, Adjudicating in Anarchy: An Expressive Theory of
International Dispute Resolution, 45 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1229, 1290-91, 1328 (2004); Eric Posner,
Judicial Independence in International Tribunals, 93 CAL. L. REV. 1, 30-31 (2005); see also Permanent
Court of Arbitration (PCA), Model Clauses, http://www.pca-cpa.org/showpage.asp?pag_id=1189.
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other first generation international tribunals are permanently empanelled at the institution in
question.200 Furthermore, interstate arbitrations does not need to be held in a particular place or
even in a public venue, unlike proceedings in national courts and other first generation
international tribunals.201 Finally, parties to an interstate arbitration are free to adopt their own
arbitral rules of procedure rather than being bound by standardized, pre-existing rules.202
Interstate arbitration therefore presents something of a dilemma for Section 1782
analyses, since interstate arbitration is only partially analogous to litigation.203 No U.S. court has
yet faced a Section 1782 request in the context of an interstate arbitration, but commentators
writing in this field have suggested that interstate arbitration should be considered to fall within
the terms of the statute because this type of proceeding was in existence in 1964, when Section
1782 was revised to include language relating to a “foreign or international tribunal.”204
200

However, the PCA has a standing list of Members of the Court who are available to be named to an
interstate proceeding, if the parties choose to use the services of the PCA. See 1907 Hague Convention,
supra note 197, arts. 45-46; 1899 Hague Convention, supra note 197, arts. 32-35; PCA, Arbitration
Services [hereinafter PCA Services], available at http://www.pca-cpa.org/showpage.asp?pag_id=1048.
201
However, the PCA does offer its facilities free of charge to states proceeding in arbitration. See PCA
Services, supra note 200. Although arbitration at the PCA does promote the concept of the majesty of the
law (indeed, the facilities at the PCA are extremely impressive), there is no requirement that an interstate
arbitration be made public, in whole or in part. However, the PCA will provide public access to the
proceedings and awards to the extent agreed by the parties. See PCA, Cases, http://www.pcacpa.org/showpage.asp?pag_id=1029.
202
However, the PCA offers a number of pre-existing rules appropriate to interstate arbitration. See PCA,
Rules of Procedure, available at http://www.pca-cpa.org/showpage.asp?pag_id=1188. Tribunals in
interstate arbitration, like other first generation international tribunals, are governed by international law
rather than national law. See Caron, supra note 166, at 115 (noting international law may be modified by
the states parties); John E. Noyes, William Howard Taft and the Taft Arbitration Treaties, 56 VILL. L.
REV. 535, 541 (2011).
203
See 28 U.S.C. §1782 (2013).
204
Id.; see also Rothstein, supra note 18, at 70. Although no court has yet considered a Section 1782
request in the context of interstate arbitration, such an issue could arise under an investment treaty, since
interstate arbitrations are contemplated under most international investment agreements. See UNITED
NATIONS CONFERENCE ON TRADE AND DEVELOPMENT (UNCTAD), WORLD INVESTMENT REPORT 2012:
TOWARD A NEW GENERATION OF INVESTMENT POLICIES 152 (2013); John R. Crook, U.S. Senate
Approves Investment Treaty With Rwanda and Mutual Legal Assistance Treaty With Bermuda,
Addressing Both Treaties’ Domestic Implementation, 106 AM. J. INT’L L. 141, 143 (2012) (noting no such
proceeding has yet been initiated under a BIT involving the United States); Jeswald W. Salacuse, The
Emerging Global Regime for Investment, 51 HARV. INT’L L. J. 427, 455 (2010).
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Although this approach has some merit, it is somewhat formalistic and fails to take into
account language in Intel indicating that courts are to “consider the origin of [the tribunal’s]
decisionmaking authority and its purpose” when considering whether the body in question
constitutes a “foreign or international tribunal” under Section 1782.205 Thus, the better argument
may be that interstate arbitration falls within the terms of the statute because such proceedings
involve an international agreement containing a grant of jurisdiction from the sovereign states to
the arbitral tribunal.206
The Supreme Court’s emphasis on jurisdictional grants is enlightening, since it minimizes
the importance of the various indicia of litigation (such as a standing set of procedural rules, a
pre-existing set of adjudicators and a formal venue for hearing the dispute) that might otherwise
be considered relevant to a Section 1782 analysis.207 While these features may help formalize
and legitimize an international proceeding, choices regarding procedural rules, selection of
arbitrators and the place of the hearing are always subject to the initial grant of jurisdiction by
the sovereign parties and therefore should be considered to hold a position of only secondary
importance.208 This observation may be useful in other types of Section 1782 determinations,
including those involving international commercial and investment arbitration.209
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In re Rhodianyl S.A.S., No. 11-1026-JTM, 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 72918, at *38 (D. Kan. Mar. 25,
2011); see also 28 U.S.C. §1782; Intel Corp. v. Advanced Micro Devices, Inc., 542 U.S. 241, 258 (2004).
206
See Born, Adjudication, supra note 23, at 795-800; see also 1907 Hague Convention, supra note 197,
arts. 37-90; 1899 Hague Convention, supra note 197, arts. 15-57. Grants of jurisdiction in interstate
arbitration involve a number of unique issues, although these matters are not fully developed in this
Article for reasons of space.
207
See 28 U.S.C. §1782.
208
See Caron, supra note 166, at 114-15.
209
See Born, Adjudication, supra note 23, at 871 (noting that “the jurisdiction of international commercial
– and investment – arbitration tribunals is defined narrowly and with considerable specificity by the
arbitration provisions of either a commercial agreement, a bilateral treaty, or another document,” whereas
national courts or supranational entities such as the ECJ feature “sweeping aspirations and broad
compulsory jurisdiction”); see also infra notes 210-323 and accompanying text.
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2.

Investment arbitration

Having considered grants of jurisdiction to national courts and first generation international
tribunals, it is now time to consider jurisdictional grants in investment arbitration so as to
determine whether investment proceedings can or should fall within Section 1782’s reference to
a “foreign or international tribunal.”210 From the outset, somewhat different results are to be
expected, since investment arbitration is typically characterized as a “second generation
international tribunal” due to certain dissimilarities between it and the various types of
international adjudication discussed up until this point.211
Initially, investment arbitration looks very much like first generation international
tribunals, since investment arbitration also requires a sovereign grant of jurisdiction through
either a bilateral212 or multilateral213 treaty.214 This feature has led some courts to suggest that
the mere fact that an arbitral tribunal is convened pursuant to a treaty is sufficient to make that
body a “foreign or international tribunal” for purposes of a request for discovery under Section
1782.215 However, that approach does not take into account the full nature of jurisdictional
grants in investment arbitration.
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See 28 U.S.C. §1782.
See Born, Adjudication, supra note 23, at 819, 831-43; see also LEW ET AL., supra note 22, ¶¶28-1 to
28-119.
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The precise number of BITs currently in existence is unknown, but approximately 2,600 to 3,000 such
treaties are believed to exist. See Alford, supra note 3, at 132; José E. Alvarez, A BIT on Custom, 2
N.Y.U. J. INT’L L. & POL. 17, 17 (2012); Born, Adjudication, supra note 23, at 844; see also Jan
Paulsson, Arbitration Without Privity, 10 ICSID REV.-FOREIGN INVEST. L.J. 232, 236 (1995) (putting the
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See ICSID Convention, supra note 48; North American Free Trade Agreement, U.S.-Can.-Mex., Dec.
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over 145 states parties. See ICSID Status, supra note 48.
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See Born, Adjudication, supra note 23, at 831-43; see also ECJ Statute, supra note 180, arts. 251, 25681; ICC Statute, supra note 180, arts. 5-8; ICJ Statute, supra note 180, arts. 1, 34-38; U.N. CHARTER, arts.
92-96; BORN, supra note 29, at 8-15.
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See 28 U.S.C. §1782; Chevron Corp., 753 F. Supp. 2d 536, 539 (D. Md. 2010).
211

45

Certainly it is true that the decision to enter into an investment treaty requires a state to
act “in a uniquely sovereign capacity.”216 In so doing, a state not only agrees to make itself
subject to the adjudicative powers of an external tribunal, it also relinquishes its sovereignty over
a certain category of claims.217 However, the jurisdictional grant in investment arbitration is
somewhat unique in that it involves the notion of a standing “offer to arbitrate.”218 Under an
offer to arbitrate, the scope of the state’s consent to arbitration
is not limited, as in commercial arbitration, to an existing dispute that is known in
advance to the consenting party or to disputes arising from a particular
relationship between juridical equals. Rather, the State is unilaterally exposed to
claims by a broad class of potential claimants in relation to governmental acts that
affect the assets of foreign investors. The disputes that lead to individual claims
under investment treaties typically arise from acts that entail the exercise of
authority that is unique to the State, such as the passage of legislation, the
adoption of mandatory regulations, or the issuance of judicial decisions. The
“general consent” is uniquely sovereign, therefore, because it is a prospective
consent to the compulsory arbitration of regulatory disputes with investors as a
group.219
In some ways, this type of jurisdictional grant is similar to that seen in cases involving
the ICC, the ICJ and the ECJ (but not interstate arbitration) in that the scope of consent involves
future disputes, rather than those that are currently in existence.220 However, state consent to
arbitration is not the only factor that is necessary for investment arbitration to arise. Individual
investors must also choose to proceed in the arbitral forum.221 Indeed, the investor’s decision to
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Van Harten, supra note 23, at 379.
Most investment treaties include a variety of dispute resolution options, including but not limited to
arbitration. See In re Caratube Int’l Oil Co., 730 F. Supp. 2d 101, 106 (D.D.C. 2010); MCLACHLAN ET
AL., supra note 7, ¶3.30. Some courts have considered this range of options to be relevant to the decision
whether to allow Section 1782 request. See 28 U.S.C. §1782; In re Caratube Int’l Oil, 730 F. Supp. 2d at
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arbitrate a dispute is critical, since, under an offer to arbitrate, “[t]he State will always be the
respondent, never a claimant.”222
Pursing a claim in investment arbitration is not the type of decision that is undertaken
lightly, since requires an investor to consider a number of important tactical issues. For example,
the decision to proceed in investment arbitration often requires the claimant to surrender the right
to proceed in other fora, including the national courts.223 This phenomenon distinguishes
investment arbitration from the “broad compulsory jurisdiction” that exists in first generation
international tribunals and national courts.224
The decision to proceed in investment arbitration not only removes the merits of the
dispute from judicial consideration, it can also eliminate the possibility of any sort of procedural
review by a national court.225 This attribute may be particularly important to Section 1782
determinations, since the Supreme Court in Intel indicated that a decision must be ultimately
reviewable (or, in some authorities’ minds, enforceable) by a national court (or the equivalent)
for the decision-maker at issue to constitute a “foreign or international tribunal” under Section
1782.226
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MCLACHLAN ET AL., supra note 7, ¶1.06.
See In re Caratube Int’l Oil, 730 F. Supp. 2d at 106; MCLACHLAN ET AL., supra note 7, ¶3.30.
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Born, Adjudication, supra note 23, at 871. However, second generation international tribunals are
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See id. at 779.
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investment regime itself. See ICSID Convention, supra note 48, art. 52; REED ET AL., supra note 21, at
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Some observers may find the issue of non-reviewability to be decisive in matters relating
to Section 1782 and may therefore conclude their analyses at this point.227 However, it is useful
to continue the discussion, not only because a certain subset of investment awards remain subject
to procedural review by national courts228 but also because there are additional insights to be
gained from this particular analytical paradigm.
First among these points is the fact that grants of jurisdiction in investment arbitration
include both a public element (i.e., the state’s decision to cede certain sovereign powers to the
arbitral tribunal) and a private element (i.e., the individual investor’s decision to waive the right
to a public forum and to instead proceed in arbitration). As a result, jurisdictional grants in
investment arbitration do not arise solely as a result of certain sovereign acts, as is the case with
first generation international tribunals and national courts.229 Instead, private parties must
affirmatively choose to proceed in investment arbitration and forego their right to litigation and
its attendant procedural protections.230
When viewed in this light, investment arbitration is easily distinguishable from both
litigation and first generation international tribunals. Furthermore, this approach also applies a
more sophisticated (and thus informative) functional analysis by focusing on the role of each
mechanism within the national and international legal order rather than emphasizing more
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See 28 U.S.C. §1782.
For example, approximately one-third of the investment arbitrations filed in 2012 would appear to be
subject to the New York Convention. See New York Convention, supra note 48; UNCTAD, Recent
Developments in Investor-State Dispute Settlement (ISDS) 2 (Mar. 2013) (noting that of the 62 new
investment arbitrations that were filed in 2012, 39 were filed with ICSID (including 7 disputes filed under
the ICSID Additional Facility), 5 were filed under the UNCITRAL Arbitration Rules and 5 were filed
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See supra notes 159-209 and accompanying text.
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This decision is critical for the investor, since investment arbitration not only includes certain
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supra note 22, ¶¶28-1 to 28-119.
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superficial attributes (such as the selection of adjudicators, procedural rules, location of the
hearing, etc.) that actually arise out of the initial grant of jurisdiction.231
The emphasis on the claimant’s choice of arbitration in the face of other procedural
alternatives also offsets commentators’ claims that “an arbitrator who is given comprehensive
jurisdiction over a claim filed under an investment treaty is as much an official of the State as
judges who are appointed for life by a government or directly elected by voters.”232 While
arbitrators in investment proceedings do enjoy a broad range of powers, it is the means by which
the tribunal obtains its jurisdiction that is important, not the scope of jurisdiction once granted.
Thus, U.S. courts have recognized that “[a]rbitration differs critically from litigation in that
arbitrators are not officials of foreign sovereign governments, but private persons tested with
their decision-making authority most commonly as a result of private parties’ entering into
contractual arrangements for the private resolution of disputes.” 233
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See Michaels, supra note 149, at 342, 357 (discussing functional methodology); see also supra note
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involve the selection of arbitrators on an ad hoc basis, although there are a growing number of repeat
players in both fields, thus making both procedures seem more akin to other types of first generation
international tribunals. See Born, Adjudication, supra note 23, at 835, 872-73; see also Daphna Kapeliuk,
The Repeat Appointment Factor: Exploring Decision Patterns of Elite Investment Arbitrators, 96
CORNELL L. REV. 47, 90 (2010); Catherine A. Rogers, The Arrival of the “Have-Nots” in International
Arbitration, 8 NEV. L.J. 341, 356-73, 379 (2007). The procedural rules used in investment arbitration are
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ET AL., supra note 22, ¶¶28-64 to 28-119; Born, Adjudication, supra note 23, at 831-43; see also supra
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supra note 23, at 798 n.70, 831-43; Anna T. Katselas, Do Investment Treaties Prescribe a Deferential
Standard of Review?, 34 MICH. J. INT’L L. 87, 102-03 (2012); see also supra notes 191-92 and
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otherwise. See REED ET AL., supra note 21, at 137.
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Van Harten, supra note 23, at 379-80 (noting “[b]oth exercise the ultimate decision-making authority
of the juridical sovereign in public law”)
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In re Medway Power Ltd., 985 F. Supp. 402, 403 (S.D.N.Y. 1997) (quoting Newman & Castilla, supra
note 18, at 69).
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Focusing on issues relating to the source of the relevant jurisdictional grant facilitates
Section 1782 analyses in two other ways.234 First, this approach minimizes the importance of
recent efforts to introduce certain litigation-oriented procedures into investment arbitration. For
example, there is an increasing movement towards transparency in investment proceedings, with
many investment awards now being published in their original or denatured (anonymized)
form.235 Many tribunals also now allow the submission of what are essentially amicus briefs so
as to ensure that the voices of other interested individuals and groups can and will be heard
during the arbitral process.236 While these measures could be interpreted as making investment
arbitration more like litigation (and hence more likely to fall within the definition of a “foreign or
international tribunal” under Section 1782), efforts to increase the transparency of investment
arbitration do not affect issues relating to the grant of jurisdiction.237 As a result, such initiatives
fall outside the type of functional analysis being conducted herein.238
Second, the emphasis on the source of jurisdictional grants avoids difficulties relating to
the common understanding of a treaty as being analogous to a contract between states.239 For
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See 28 U.S.C. §1782 (2013).
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See Michaels, supra note 149, at 342, 357 (discussing functional analyses).
239
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example, at least one court has indicated that it was “reluctant . . . to interfere with the parties’
bargained-for expectations concerning the arbitration process” in the context of a bilateral
investment arbitration.240 Although contract analyses have their place,241 they can inadvertently
minimize the role played by claimants in the grant of jurisdiction in an investment arbitration and
can therefore be somewhat misleading in this context.

3.

International commercial arbitration

Investment arbitration is not the only type of proceeding that can be characterized as a second
generation international tribunal.242 International commercial arbitration can also be placed
within this category, even though international commercial arbitration is sometimes overlooked
in scholarly debates about methods of international adjudication due to the belief that
international commercial arbitration is a private international device and therefore
distinguishable from procedures arising as a matter of public international law.243 However,
international commercial arbitration is heavily influenced by a number of international treaties,

Corp., 466 U.S. 243, 253 (1984); McKevitt v. Mueller, 689 F. Supp. 2d 661, 668 (S.D.N.Y. 2010).
However, other authorities have noted the limitation of this particular analogy, particularly in the context
of multilateral treaties. See Samantha Besson, The Authority of International Law – Lifting the State Veil,
31 SYDNEY L. REV. 343, 361 (2009) (noting multilateral treaties may be more akin to legislation); Jo M.
Pasqualucci, Advisory Practice of the Inter-American Court of Human Rights: Contributing to the
Evolution of Human Rights Law, 38 STAN. J. INT’L L. 241, 244-45 (2002).
240
In re Caratube Int’l Oil Co., 730 F. Supp. 2d 101, 106 (D.D.C. 2010). That court also noted that the
BIT in question offered the parties a range of dispute resolution options, which made the selection of
arbitration more important. See id.; see also MCLACHLAN ET AL., supra note 7, ¶3.30 (discussing “fork
in the road” provisions).
241
See infra notes 256-96 and accompanying text.
242
See Born, Adjudication, supra note 23, at 831-43.
243
See id. at 829; S.I. Strong, Beyond the Self-Execution Analysis: Rationalizing Constitutional, Treaty
and Statutory Interpretation in International Commercial Arbitration, 53 VA. J. INT’L L. __ (2013)
[hereinafter Strong, Interpretation].

51

which means that international commercial arbitration can and should be considered from the
perspective of public international law as well as private international law.244
At this point, courts and commentators are split as to the propriety of Section 1782
requests in cases involving international commercial arbitration, with much of the debate
focusing on what is perceived to be the private nature of consent to commercial arbitration.245
For example, some commentators have suggested that because “the disputing parties – acting in
a private capacity – have agreed to use a particular method of dispute resolution in disputes
arising between themselves,” they have essentially “agreed, in a manner endorsed by the State, to
insulate the adjudication of their dispute from the courts and subject it instead to arbitration.”246
Under this view, “private arbitrations are generally considered alternatives to, rather than
precursors to, formal litigation.”247
As useful as this approach may be, it does not fully explain the process by which
international commercial arbitration arises.248 Furthermore, this perspective is based, at least to
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some extent, on the view that arbitration is an alternative to litigation, a principle that is still
somewhat controversial, both in general terms and in the context of Section 1782 requests.249
Interestingly, a number of the problems that arise in an analysis based solely on private
consent may be resolved by characterizing the issue in terms of jurisdictional grants. Framing
the issue in terms of jurisdictional grants also falls more firmly in line with the analytic criteria
suggested by Intel. 250
Under the theory posited here, jurisdictional grants in arbitration include two separate
elements: a public grant of jurisdiction, which is reflected by the state’s authorization of
arbitration, and a private grant of jurisdiction, which is reflected by the consent of the parties.251
Both types of jurisdictional grants include substantive252 and procedural elements.253
Private grants of jurisdiction are outlined in the arbitration agreement between the parties,
while public grants of jurisdiction are found in national statutes regarding international
commercial arbitration (such as the Federal Arbitration Act (FAA))254 and international treaties
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(such as the 1958 United Nations Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign
Arbitral Awards, more commonly known as the New York Convention).255 Each of the two
types of jurisdictional grants will be considered separately.

a.

Private grants of jurisdiction

Private grants of jurisdiction are reflected in the parties’ arbitration agreement and typically exist
as a matter of contract.256 Most debate concerning the interplay between Section 1782 and
international commercial arbitration has focused on whether and to what extent Section 1782
upsets the parties’ contractual expectations regarding the scope of arbitral disclosure.257 Up until
this point, courts and commentators have analyzed these matters pursuant to the discretionary
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See New York Convention, supra note 48. The United States has also ratified the Inter-American
Convention on International Commercial Arbitration, more commonly known as the Panama Convention.
See Panama Convention, supra note 48. Although there are a number of important differences between
the Panama and New York Conventions, Congress has indicated that the two are to be construed in a
similar manner. See House Report No. 501, 101st Cong., 2d Sess. 4 (1990), reprinted in 1990
U.S.C.C.A.N. 675, 678; DRC, Inc. v. Republic of Honduras, 774 F. Supp. 2d 66, 71 (D.D.C. 2011);
Employers Ins. of Wasau v. Banco Seguros Del Estado, 34 F. Supp. 2d 1115, 1120 (E.D. Wis.), aff’d, 199
F.3d 937 (7th Cir. 1999); BORN, supra note 29, at 104; Bowman, supra note 48, at 1-2, 19-20. Therefore,
this Article will focus solely on the New York Convention. See New York Convention, supra note 48.
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See AT&T Mobility LLC v. Concepcion, 131 S. Ct. 1740, 1751-53 (2011); Rent–A–Center, West, Inc.
v. Jackson, 130 S. Ct. 2772, 2776 (2010); Stolt-Nielsen S.A. v. AnimalFeeds Int’l Corp., 130 S. Ct. 1758,
1775-76 (2010). Not all states require arbitration agreements to be contractual in nature. See
Gerardo J. Bosques-Hernández, Arbitration Clauses in Trusts: The U.S. Developments and a
Comparative Perspective, INDRET, no. 3, 2008 at 1, 10, available at
http://www.indret.com/pdf/559_en.pdf (noting some states, such as Spain, have “abandon[ed] the
traditional strictly contractual or bilateral approach of the arbitration”); Christopher P. Koch, A Tale of
Two Cities! – Arbitrating Trust Disputes and the ICC’s Arbitration Clause for Trust Disputes, 2 Y.B.
INT’L ARB. 178, 196 (2012).
257
See 28 U.S.C. §1782. Although an in-depth of discussion of the differences between U.S.-style
discovery and arbitral disclosure is beyond the scope of this Article, various authorities have discussed
how radically the two procedures differ and how the adoption of U.S. discovery devices in arbitration
would upset the parties’ contractual expectations. See Jalal El Ahdab & Amal Bouchenaki, Discovery in
International Arbitration: A Foreign Creature for Civil Lawyers?, in ARBITRATION ADVOCACY IN
CHANGING TIMES, XV ICCA CONG. SER. (2010 Rio) 65 (2011); Alford, supra note 3, at 139; Javier
Rubenstein, International Commercial Arbitration: Reflections at the Crossroads of the Common Law
and Civil Law Traditions, 5 CHI. J. INT’L L. 303, 304 (2004).
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analysis outlined in Intel.258 However, this sort of approach bypasses the preliminary question of
whether international commercial arbitration even constitutes a “foreign or international
tribunal” under Section 1782.259 Framing international commercial arbitration as involving both
public and private jurisdictional grants not only brings the analysis forward to the time when the
initial determination about the applicability of the statute to the underlying proceeding is made, it
also considers an important issue (i.e., contractual grants of jurisdiction) that was overlooked in
Intel due to the public nature of the European bodies involved in that dispute.260
When evaluating the scope and nature of private grants of jurisdiction in arbitration, it is
useful to consider a number of U.S. Supreme Court precedents that describe the need to enforce
arbitration agreements according to their terms, a goal that is said to be particularly vital in cases
involving international disputes.261 Although interpretive difficulties can arise if a particular
procedure (such as discovery under Section 1782) is not explicitly addressed by the parties, the
Court has suggested that “[t]he point of affording parties discretion in designing arbitration
processes is to allow for efficient, streamlined procedures tailored to the type of dispute.”262
Furthermore, procedures that “include[] absent parties, necessitating additional and different

See Intel Corp. v. Advanced Micro Devices, Inc., 542 U.S. 241, 265 (2004) (noting “a district court
could consider whether the §1782(a) request conceals an attempt to circumvent foreign proof-gathering
restrictions or other policies of a foreign country or the United States”); see supra note 54 and
accompanying text. See Intel, 542 U.S. at 241.
259
See 28 U.S.C. §1782.
260
See Intel, 542 U.S. at 241.
261
See Volt Info. Scis., Inc. v. Bd. of Tr. of Leland Stanford Jr. Univ., 489 U.S. 468, 478 (1989);
Mitsubishi Motors Corp. v. Soler Chrysler-Plymouth, Inc., 473 U.S. 614, 629 (1985); Scherk v. AlbertoCulver Co., 417 U.S. 506, 518-19 (1974); M/S Bremen v. Zapata Off-Shore Co., 407 U.S. 1, 9 (1972).
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AT&T Mobility LLC v. Concepcion, 131 S. Ct. 1740, 1749 (2011); see also 28 U.S.C. §1782 (2013);
Stolt-Nielsen S.A. v. AnimalFeeds Int’l Corp., 130 S. Ct. 1758, 1775-76 (2010); Sutter v. Oxford Health
Plans LLC, 675 F.3d 215 (3d Cir.), cert. granted, 133 S. Ct. 786 (2012); In re Am. Express Merchs.
Litig., 667 F.3d 204 (2d Cir.), cert. granted sub nom. Am. Express Co. v. Italian Colors Rest., 133 S. Ct.
594 (2012). Commentators have at times disagreed with this characterization of the nature and purpose of
arbitration. See S.I. STRONG, CLASS, MASS AND COLLECTIVE ARBITRATION IN NATIONAL AND
INTERNATIONAL LAW ¶3.75 (2013) [hereinafter STRONG, CLASS]; Born & Salas, supra note 32, at 22;
Strong, First Principles, supra note 32, at 246-68.
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procedures and involving higher stakes,” and that threaten arbitral confidentiality are considered
to violate the text and purpose of the FAA.263
This line of cases suggests that discovery under Section 1782 should be considered
inappropriate in international commercial arbitration, since such requests impose “additional and
different procedures” and change the stakes of the arbitration.264 Section 1782 can also be seen
as threatening arbitral confidentiality, particularly when conducted prior to or during the
proceeding itself,265 and can affect third parties to the arbitration.266 Thus, existing Supreme
Court precedent strongly suggests that requests for discovery under Section 1782 should not be
permitted in cases involving international commercial arbitration.267
Some commentators have suggested that the easiest way to avoid any difficulties relating
to the interpretation of an arbitration agreement that is silent as to the possibility of discovery
under Section 1782 would be simply to include a provision explicitly barring recourse to the
statute.268 Although that approach would of course be effective, it is also highly unrealistic,
since it would require parties to an arbitration that is seated in any country in the world other
than the United States and that may not even involve a U.S. disputant to anticipate and exclude
requests under Section 1782.269 This technique may also be largely ineffective (since such
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AT&T Mobility, 131 S. Ct. at 1749-50; see also 9 U.S.C. §§1-307 (2013).
AT&T Mobility, 131 S. Ct. at 1749-50; see also 28 U.S.C. §1782. The differences between arbitral
disclosure and U.S.-style discovery are significant. See El Ahdab & Bouchenaki, supra note 257, at 65;
Alford, supra note 3, at 139; Rubenstein, supra note 257, at 304.
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See 28 U.S.C. §1782. A different result may obtain if discovery under Section 1782 is sought after the
conclusion of the arbitral proceedings, when the award is being enforced. See also infra note 285 and
accompanying text.
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See 28 U.S.C. §1782 (referring to requests by “any interested person” and allowing discovery of any
person who “resides or is found” in the United States); Alford, supra note 3, at 140-41.
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See 28 U.S.C. §1782.
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See id.; Alford, supra note 3, at 151; Rothstein, supra note 18, at 88.
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See 28 U.S.C. §1782.
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provisions would only bind parties to the arbitration agreement)270 and can be seen as violating
the conventional understanding of the appropriate structure of default rules.271
When considering private grants of jurisdiction, it is helpful to distinguish between the
parties’ positive grant of jurisdiction to the arbitral tribunal and the parties’ negative grant of
jurisdiction to the courts.272 Most scholarly and judicial analysis focuses on the first of these
elements, which relates to the parties’ positive right to choose the venue in which a dispute is
heard through use of an arbitration agreement or forum selection clause.273 However, U.S. law
also recognizes the concept of a negative grant of jurisdiction. Parties can make their intention
to deny jurisdiction to a particular court known through a variety of means, ranging from forum

See id. (allowing “any interested person” to make a request under the statute, not just a party to the
underlying proceeding). It is possible that a court could rely on the law of non-signatories to extend the
effect of provision relating to Section 1782 to non-parties to the arbitration. See id.; Invista S.A.R.L. v.
Rhodia, Ltd., 625 F.3d 75, 85 (3rd Cir. 2010); InterGen NV v. Grina, 344 F.3d 134, 145-50 (1st Cir.
2003); Thomson-CSF, SA v. American Arbitration Ass’n, 64 F.3d 773, 776 (2d Cir. 1995) (describing
circumstances in which a non-signatory may be bound by an arbitration agreement); BORN, supra note
29, at 1137-38, 1142-1211. Of course, if the arbitral proceedings do not fall under the statutory definition
of a “foreign or international tribunal,” non-litigants would have no ability to seek discovery under
Section 1782 in the first place. See 28 U.S.C. §1782.
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chosen ex ante.” Alan Scott Rau & Edward F. Sherman, Tradition and Innovation in International
Arbitration Procedure, 30 TEX. INT’L L.J. 89, 115 (1995). There is a considerable body of literature
concerning default rules, although the discussion is outside the scope of the current Article. See, e.g., Ian
Ayres, Valuing Modern Contract Scholarship, 112 YALE L.J. 881 (2003); Ian Ayres, Ya-huh: There Are
and Should Be Penalty Defaults, 33 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 589, 589-90 (2006); Ian Ayres & Robert Gernter,
Filling Gaps in Incomplete Contracts: An Economic Theory of Default Rules, 99 YALE L.J. 87 (1989);
Ian Ayres & Robert Gernter, Majoritarian vs. Minoritarian Defaults, 51 STAN. L. REV. 1591 (1999); Ian
Ayres & Robert Gernter, Strategic Contractual Inefficiency and the Optimal Choice of Legal Rules, 101
YALE L.J. 729 (1992); Jason Scott Johnston, Strategic Bargaining and the Economic Theory of Contract
Default Rules, 100 YALE L.J. 615 (1990); Eric A. Posner, Economic Analysis of Contract Law After
Three Decades: Success or Failure? 112 YALE L.J. 829 (2003).
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See New York Convention, supra note 48, art. II; BORN, supra note 29, at 1004-48; LEW ET AL., supra
note 22, ¶15-1.
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See Vimar Seguros y Reaseguros, S.A. v. M/V Sky Reefer, 515 U.S. 528, 537-38 (1995); The Bremen
v. Zapata Off–Shore Co., 407 U.S. 1, 12 (1972).
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selection clauses to releases, advance waivers of litigation and covenants not to sue.274 Each of
these agreements essentially deny a court that would otherwise have proper jurisdiction over a
matter the opportunity to hear a particular dispute as a matter of party autonomy. Arbitration
agreements also contain reflect a negative grant of jurisdiction, although the parties’ intent to
exclude the jurisdictional power of the courts in those circumstances may be implicit rather than
explicit.275
The fact that a negative grant of jurisdiction is implicit rather than explicit should not
create any conceptual problems, since parties have long been considered capable of signifying
their consent to certain procedures in arbitration through implicit means.276 However, it can
often be difficult to ascertain both the existence and scope of an implicit agreement regarding a
procedural matter. Therefore, it may be beneficial to consider how an implied negative grant of
jurisdiction operates in other contexts and how a Section 1782 request might be received in those
other scenarios.277
Some useful analogies may be drawn to other forms of alternative dispute resolution,
such as mediation or conciliation. Indeed, it is altogether possible that a court may shortly be
asked to consider a Section 1782 request in the context of an agreement to mediate or conciliate
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See Town of Newton v. Rumery, 480 U.S. 386, 391-98 (1987); Bradford P. Anderson, Please Release
Me, Let Me Go! Releases of Unknown Claims in the Penumbra of California Civil Code 1542, 9 U.C.
DAVIS BUS. L.J. 1, 7 (2008) (noting such agreements might require mutual consideration, depending on
the governing law and the circumstances in which the agreement was made).
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20, 2011); Ex rel Winning (HK) Int’l Shipping Co. Ltd., No. 09-22659-MC, 2010 WL 1796579, at *9
(S.D. Fla. Apr. 30, 2010); In re Norfolk Southern Corp., 626 F. Supp. 2d 882, 886 (N.D. Ill. 2009.
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a dispute either on a standalone basis or as part of a multi-tier dispute resolution provision (also
known as a “step” clause).278
Significant questions exist as to whether a mediation could support a request for
discovery under Section 1782.279 On the one hand, some people might find the link between
mediation and litigation to be too attenuated to permit a request for discovery under the
statute.280 However, Intel denied the need to establish that “adjudicative proceedings are
‘pending’ or ‘imminent’”281 and instead indicated that “a proceeding in a foreign or international
tribunal” need only be “within reasonable contemplation” of the parties at the time the request
for discovery under Section 1782 was made.282 Since litigation is at least as likely to arise in a
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See id. No known cases address this question. However, mediation is becoming increasingly popular
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arbitration. See Beale et al., supra note 18, at 94; Fellas, supra note 18, at 388; Thomas J. Stipanowich &
J. Ryan Lamare, Living With ADR: Evolving Perceptions and Use of Mediation, Arbitration and Conflict
Management in Fortune 1,000 Companies, __ HARV. NEGOT. L. REV. __ (forthcoming), available at
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conciliation cases to date); Nancy A. Welsh & Andrea Kupfer Schneider, The Thoughtful Integration of
Mediation into International Investment Treaty Arbitration, 18 HARV. NEGOT. L. REV. __ (forthcoming
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mediated dispute as in an arbitrated dispute, any argument based on attenuation would appear to
be unavailing in the mediation context.283
However, use of Section 1782 in a mediation appears inherently inappropriate, since
parties to a mediation clearly want to avoid judicial proceedings.284 Allowing a request for
discovery under Section 1782 would obviously violate the purpose, intention and effectiveness
of the parties’ private agreement to mediate while also contravening state policies encouraging
the use of alternative means of dispute resolution.285 As a result, most people would likely
conclude that discovery under Section 1782 should not be permitted in cases involving mediation
or conciliation.286
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Litigation in the mediation context could arise either as a result of an unsuccessful mediation or as a
result of non-compliance with a settlement agreement arising out of a successful mediation. Litigation in
the arbitration context could arise as a result of a motion to enforce the arbitral award. However, most
parties voluntarily comply with arbitral awards in the context of both international commercial and
investment arbitration. See NIGEL BLACKABY ET AL., REDFERN AND HUNTER ON INTERNATIONAL
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circumvent the standard disclosure mechanisms. See 28 U.S.C. §1782; Intel, 542 U.S. at 265; Alford,
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Supporters of Section 1782 might try to distinguish arbitration from mediation and
conciliation based on various functional attributes.287 However, the pro-arbitration policy
embedded within the FAA (particularly in its international chapters) and espoused by the
Supreme Court288 appears to be far stronger than any pro-mediation policy that might be in the
process of developing,289 which suggests that requests under Section 1782 are even less
appropriate in arbitration than in mediation.290 Since discovery under Section 1782 is not
warranted in mediation, such practices are equally (if not more) disfavored in arbitration.291
Another way to consider negative grants of jurisdiction involves what might be called the
parties’ “individual participatory rights.” 292 Although the precise content of these rights may
vary somewhat according to the dictates of each particular legal system, the core attributes
appear to involve the claimant’s ability to choose whether, when and where to bring a legal
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while arbitration is seen as inherently adjudicative. See Stipanowich, Litigation, supra note 168, at 4, 24;
see also Jacqueline Nolan-Haley, Mediation: The “New” Arbitration, 17 HARV. NEGOT. L. REV. 61, 6465 (2012).
288
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claim.293 This principle is protected as a matter of both national and international law and can in
some jurisdictions rise to the level of a constitutional right.294
The concept of individual participatory rights may also protect a claimant’s ability to
choose the manner in which a suit is asserted.295 Although the scope of this element is only now
being fully considered, recognition of such a right would be highly relevant to Section 1782
analyses, since it would underscore the importance of both positive and negative grants of
jurisdiction and make the decision to exclude all forms of litigation, including discovery under
Section 1782, fundamental and perhaps even constitutional in nature.296

b.

Public grants of jurisdiction
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Rights of the European Union, 2000/C 364/1, art. 47, 18 December 2000; Alford, supra note 3, at 129;
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Most analyses involving Section 1782 and international commercial arbitration have focused on
matters relating to private grants of jurisdiction (i.e., party consent).297 However, arbitration also
involves a public grant of jurisdiction, as described in the FAA and the relevant treaties on
arbitration.298 Although public grants of jurisdiction are often characterized as reflecting the
various limits that the state places on the parties’ exercise of procedural autonomy, statutes and
treaties relating to arbitration also identify the limits that the state places on itself.299
Public grants of jurisdiction, like private grants of jurisdiction, have both a negative and
positive quality.300 The positive aspects of the public grant of jurisdiction are quite broad and
basically allow the parties to adopt any procedure that does not contravene certain fundamental
principles of due process.301 Principles of procedural fairness are more general in arbitration
than in litigation, and arbitral due process focuses primarily on concepts such as reasonable
notice, equal treatment and the opportunity to present one’s case.302 Parties may not contract out
of these basic precepts, which “may be applied ex officio,”303 and the failure to adhere to these
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principles results in an award that is unenforceable under both the New York Convention and the
FAA.304
Some of these fundamental principles of procedural fairness could be implicated in a
Section 1782 analysis.305 For example, some parties could argue that the inability to seek
discovery under Section 1782 hinders their opportunity to present their case.306 However, that
argument would in many ways be difficult to make, since the absence of discovery under Section
1782 has never violated the principle of procedural fairness in the past.307 Furthermore,
principles relating to the negative grant of jurisdiction suggest that the state does not have the
ability to intervene in the arbitration in this manner.
Negative aspects of the public grant of jurisdiction are typically described pursuant to the
principle of judicial non-interference.308 According to this notion, courts are to avoid becoming
involved in an arbitration except at appropriate times and in appropriate ways.309 Although
experts disagree about what constitutes an “appropriate” form of judicial intervention,310 it is
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clear that both the FAA and the New York Convention contemplate limited judicial review of
arbitral awards to protect both the parties and the state from certain types of procedural error.311
A number of authorities have suggested that the courts’ ability to conduct this type of
limited judicial review destroys the procedural independence of international arbitration and
brings arbitral proceedings within the definition of a “foreign or international tribunal” under
Section 1782.312 Essentially, the argument is that requests for discovery under Section 1782 are
appropriate because the court retains some sort of residual jurisdiction over the arbitral dispute as
a result of the procedural review process.313
However, there are some problems with this approach, most notably in the way in which
it views jurisdiction as either existing in its entirety or not at all. Under this type of exclusive
jurisdictional model, the exercise of judicial control over any aspect of arbitration makes the
dispute justiciable and therefore subject to Intel’s edict about judicial reviewability.314 However,
it may not be necessary to ask whether arbitration constitutes a complete or only partial
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See 9 U.S.C. §§10, 201-02, 208, 301-02, 307 (2013); New York Convention, supra note 48, art. V.
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508 F.3d 49, 56 (1st Cir. 2007); Windward Agency, Inc. v. Cologne Life Reins. Co., 123 Fed. App’x 481,
**1 (3d Cir. 2005) (noting arbitration does not completely oust the court of jurisdiction, since the court
retains some oversight capacity); see also RUTLEDGE, supra note 165, at 15-54.
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See 28 U.S.C. §1782; RUTLEDGE, supra note 165, at 16.
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divestment of judicial jurisdiction. Instead, it may be more useful as well as more accurate to
consider litigation and arbitration as reflecting a type of shared or concurrent jurisdiction.315
The concept of concurrent jurisdiction exists in both national316 and international legal
systems,317 thereby making it a sufficiently well-known model to consider in the current context.
One of the key elements of the notion of concurrent jurisdiction is the way in which the decision
to proceed in one forum can foreclose the opportunity for both adjudication in and intervention
from other fora. This principle is perhaps most apparent in cases involving investment
arbitration, where certain “fork in the road” decisions can preclude other jurisdictional options.318
However, the analogy can be extended to other situations in which parties must bear the burdens
of their jurisdictional choices.319
Concurrent jurisdiction therefore explains the way in which the filing of a claim in
arbitration precludes litigation on the same cause of action.320 However, the notion of concurrent
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Another alternative would be to view arbitral tribunals as a form of inferior federal court. See Roger J.
Perlstadt, Article III Judicial Power and the Federal Arbitration Act, 62 AM. U. L. REV. 201, 226 n.118
(2012).
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See Haywood v. Drown, 556 U.S. 729, 735-36 (2009) (discussing presumption of concurrent
jurisdiction under U.S. law).
317
See Pauwelyn & Salles, supra note 183, at 84.
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Judicial Function in International Investment Law, 39 SYRACUSE J. INT’L L. & COM. 89, 104 (2011)
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abstention); Railroad Commission of Texas v. Pullman Co., 312 U.S. 496 (1941) (regarding Pullman
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Federal Regulatory Purpose, 64 ADMIN. L. REV. 1, 18 (2012); Austen L. Parrish, Duplicative Foreign
Litigation, 78 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 237, 247-51 (2010); Pauwelyn & Salles, supra note 183, at 85-86, 9293.
320
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jurisdiction also provides insights relating to limited procedural review of arbitral awards. Here,
the U.S. federal system provides an excellent analytical model.
Longstanding legal authority indicates that the U.S. Supreme Court is constitutionally
entitled to review U.S. state court decisions for error on matters of constitutional or federal
law.321 Questions of state law are immune from this limited form of Supreme Court review.322
Furthermore, the right of limited review of questions of constitutional or federal law does not
entitle either the U.S. Supreme Court or the lower federal courts to intervene in or “assist” state
court proceedings in any way.
The Supreme Court’s power of review relating to state court decisions appears largely
analogous to procedural reviews of arbitral awards. In both cases, the reviewing entity is strictly
limited in what issues it can consider. Furthermore, the review process is restricted in both cases
to one time period following the determination on the merits. Given these similarities, it appears
appropriate to extend the Supreme Court’s inability to interfere with ongoing state court
proceedings to the arbitral context by analogy and thereby conclude that the decision to proceed
in arbitration can and should be considered to cut off any ability to seek judicially mandated
discovery under Section 1782.323

B.

State Interests

Considering requests under Section 1782 in the context of jurisdictional grants may prove a
useful and persuasive framework for analysis for some courts and commentators.324 However,
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See Cohens v. Virginia, 19 U.S. (6 Wheat.) 264, 415-16 (1821); Cynthia L. Fontaine, Article III and
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other people may take the view that, simply by enacting Section 1782, the United States has
indicated a state interest in the provision of discovery in cases involving foreign and international
tribunals and that such interests must be respected to the extent possible.325
Certainly it is true that states have asserted a longstanding interest in the full and fair
adjudication of legal disputes, regardless of whether the underlying dispute is heard in litigation
or arbitration.326 Requests for discovery under Section 1782 might be considered legitimate to
the extent they can be located within that line of authority.327 However, doing so would require
courts to conclude both that U.S.-style discovery was somehow necessary to provide parties with
the information needed to adjudicate their claims and defenses in a full and fair manner328 and
that the United States had both the right and the ability to provide this kind of judicial assistance.

See id.; City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Ctr., Inc., 473 U.S. 432, 440 (1985) (“The general rule is
that legislation is presumed to be valid and will be sustained if the classification drawn by the statute is
rationally related to a legitimate state interest.”); see also Corinna Barrett Lain, Upside-Down Judicial
Review, 101 GEO. L.J. 113. 175 (2012) (discussing judicial review when legislation is no longer in
harmony with social interests). One issue that courts have not yet considered is the fact that U.S. parties
will bear the brunt of discovery under Section 1782, since the procedure relates only to persons and
documents found here. See 28 U.S.C. §1782; Beale et al., supra note 18, at 54; Rothstein, supra note 18,
at 90. Although Congress may have taken this concern into account when passing Section 1782 and
decided that the state interest in protecting U.S. nationals should be subordinated to the alleged state
interest in U.S.-style discovery, the courts do not appear to have considered this issue at length. See Intel
Corp. v. Advanced Micro Devices, Inc., 542 U.S. 241, 252 (2004) (indicating that Section 1782 had the
“twin aims of ‘providing efficient assistance to participants in international litigation and encouraging
foreign countries by example to provide similar assistance to our courts’”); Alford, supra note 3, at 129.
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Dicta]; see also Marmazov & Pushkar, supra note 294, at 52-64. Some commentators have suggested
that the state interest in promoting commerce is the primary driving force in international commercial
arbitration. See Loukas Mistelis, Reality Test: Current State of Affairs in Theory and Practice Relating
to “Lex Arbitri,” 17 AM. REV. INT’L L. 155, 178 (2006) (suggesting commercial interests overcome state
interests in “subjecting arbitration proceedings to national law”).
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See 28 U.S.C. §1782.
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Some commentators have suggested that Section 1782 was central to Chevron’s ability to assert its
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1782 requests. See id.; Alford, supra note 3, at 128, 146.
325

68

Initially, it would appear that the United States has the ability to provide this sort of
assistance, since states are entitled to regulate behavior within their own territorial borders.329
However, demonstrating a right to provide this kind of judicially mandated discovery is highly
problematic, given that national courts have only a limited grant of jurisdiction in matters
relating to arbitration.330 Furthermore, the international legal community holds deeply divergent
opinions about whether involuntary disclosure of information and documents is necessary to
establish a cause of action as a general concern. While U.S.-trained lawyers are often
acculturated to believe that broad, sweeping discovery is the best, if not only, way to allow
parties to prove their claims and defenses,331 lawyers from other legal systems disagree strongly,
often finding it strange (if not offensive) that the United States would attempt to provide this type
of “assistance” to foreign and international tribunals.332 Indeed, most “parties and counsel
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Nixon, 418 U.S. 683, 709-10 (1974) (noting “that ‘the public has the right to every man’s evidence’” with
some narrow exceptions (citations omitted)); see also Intel Corp. v. Advanced Micro Devices, Inc., 542
U.S. 241, 252 (2004) (indicating that Section 1782 had the “twin aims of ‘providing efficient assistance to
participants in international litigation and encouraging foreign countries by example to provide similar
assistance to our courts’”). Conversely, U.S. law considers it every person’s duty to provide evidence to
an ongoing litigation, even if that person is not a litigant. See FED. R. CIV. P. 26(b)(1); Nixon, 418 U.S. at
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679 (2006).
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outside the United States view the prospect of American-style discovery” with “horror,”
including in situations involving Section 1782.333
The U.S. Supreme Court attempted to assuage the concerns of foreign parties, courts and
counsel about the scope and nature of U.S.-style discovery by claiming in Intel that district
courts could control the excessive use of Section 1782 through the use of judicial discretion.334
However, that approach actually “make[s] district courts’ decisions all the more difficult and
perhaps unpredictable for applicants.335 Furthermore, “the United States system works
somewhat unilaterally under the assumption that United States-style discovery is good in itself,
whatever the proceedings may be, even if they take place in a country [or in a process, such as
arbitration] where no such discovery is known.”336 Indeed, requests under Section 1782 could be
made simply to harass other parties.337
Thus, it is necessary to determine whether the United States can assert any sort of
defensible state interest in Section 1782 in the context of arbitration.338 This task is
somewhat challenging, given the scarcity of research relating to state interests in a
particular procedural device even outside the Section 1782 analysis.339 Nevertheless,
some useful observations may be made relating to both international commercial and
investment arbitration.
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1.

Investment arbitration

Although states have an interest in the proper conduct of an arbitration, concerns about
procedural fairness may be particularly heightened in the investment context, since investment
disputes often involve matters of a public or regulatory nature.340 For example, investment
arbitration not only carries “implications for the ‘public purse’ (ie awards against the host State
or State entity are funded through taxes levied on citizens),” it also “involves other important
public interests” to the extent the disputes “arise in public service sectors that affect the daily life
of citizens[,] . . . challenge regulatory measures intended by States to protect the public welfare, .
. . [and] have a ‘chilling effect’ on States adopting public welfare regulations.”341 Investment
arbitration is also said to provide “an effective means to redress grievances arising from
government misconduct” and empower arbitral tribunals “to sit in judgment on the acts of
government, including acts of the judiciary.342
These attributes suggest that discovery under Section 1782 might be warranted as a
means of protecting the public interest in the substance of an investment dispute.343 However,
any special concerns relating to an investment dispute, be they substantive or procedural, must be
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See William B. Burke-White & Andreas von Staden, Private Litigation in a Public Law Sphere: The
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specifically identified in the underlying treaty if they are to be considered protectable.344 The
question, therefore, is whether discovery under Section 1782 is protected under the relevant
investment treaties.345
In considering this issue, it is important to distinguish between two different scenarios.
First, a Section 1782 request could be made in a situation where the underlying investment treaty
was signed or ratified by the United States.346 In these cases, the United States has at least a
facial interest in arbitral procedures, since the United States is a party to the underlying
agreement. Second, a Section 1782 request could be made in a situation where the underlying
investment treaty was not signed or ratified by the United States.347 In these cases, the
connection between the arbitration and the United States is much more attenuated. Although a
court may be able to identify some type of freestanding state interest in providing discovery
under Section 1782 (such as an interest in upholding the international investment regime as a
general proposition), the analytical approach will be quite different than in the first scenario.348
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Determining whether discovery under Section 1782 is protected under a particular treaty
can be a complicated process.349 Although states parties to an investment treaty can and
sometimes do outline the particular procedures to be followed in an arbitration in the treaty
itself,350 it is more common for states parties to indicate that any arbitration arising under the
treaty will be governed by a pre-existing set of arbitration rules.351 Some of the more popular
options are the ICSID Arbitration Rules, the ICSID Additional Facility, the UNCITRAL
Arbitration Rules and the arbitration rules promulgated by the International Chamber of
Commerce (ICC Arbitration Rules) and the Stockholm Chamber of Commerce (SCC Arbitration
Rules).352
What is perhaps most striking about these procedural rules is that they do not give
national courts any independent power to intervene in procedural matters.353 At the most, the
courts are permitted to assist the arbitral tribunal upon the arbitrators’ request.354
This interpretation of the various procedural rules is consistent with treaty provisions
indicating that an investor’s decision to pursue treaty-based arbitration results in the exclusion of
any recourse to the national courts.355 Although each treaty must be analyzed on its own
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merits,356 these two phenomena, taken together, suggest that states parties have surrendered any
interest they might otherwise have had in domestic procedural mechanisms (such as discovery
under Section 1782) in disputes arising out of an international investment treaty.357 Furthermore,
if the states parties to a particular treaty-related dispute have no defensible interest in such
procedures, then third party states (such as the United States in any dispute arising under a treaty
that has not been signed by the United States) cannot have any such interest, either.
The most obvious response to this initial conclusion would be that Section 1782 lies
entirely outside the terms of the treaty and therefore does not conflict with the provisions of the
treaty or the rules of arbitration.358 Furthermore, Section 1782 does not require any actions to be
taken in the arbitration itself, nor does the statute oblige the arbitral tribunal to accept the fruits
of the Section 1782 request.359 However, the silence of a treaty or rule set on this particular issue
cannot constitute a license to allow judicial intervention.360 Instead, a more nuanced analysis is
necessary.
Investment treaties are interpreted pursuant to the Vienna Convention on the Law of
Treaties (Vienna Convention), which indicates that courts should adopt an interpretive
methodology based on “good faith in accordance with the ordinary meaning to be given to the
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terms of the treaty in their context and in the light of its object and purpose.”361 To the extent
that an investment treaty explicitly incorporates an arbitral rule set by reference, then those rules
should also be interpreted pursuant to Vienna Convention norms, since the rules have become
part of the interstate agreement.362
The benefit of the Vienna Convention methodology is that it can be used to address
matters (such as Section 1782) on which the treaty is silent.363 Although the task of
interpretation is made somewhat more challenging due to the lack of consensus about the
substantive or procedural purpose of the investment regime,364 some useful observations may be
nevertheless made.365
For example, when considering whether Section 1782 is consistent with the purpose and
object of a particular treaty or rule set, it may be possible to draw on certain fundamental

361

See Vienna Convention, supra note 334, art. 31(1); MCLACHLAN ET AL., supra note 7, ¶¶3.66-3.103.
See Vienna Convention, supra note 334.
363
See id.; 28 U.S.C. §1782.
364
See Alex Mills, Antinomies of Public and Private at the Foundations of International Investment Law
and Arbitration, 14 J. INT’L ECON. L. 469, 501-02 (2011); S.I. Strong, Mass Procedures as a Form of
‘Regulatory Arbitration’ – Abaclat v. Argentine Republic and the International Investment Regime, 38 J.
COPR. L. 259, 300-03 (2013) [hereinafter Strong, Regulatory Arbitration]; Gus Van Harten & Martin
Loughlin, Investment Treaty Arbitration as a Species of Global Administrative Law, 17 EUR. J. INT’L L.
121, 124-27, 148 (2006). Experience shows that silence on procedural matters can lead to extensive
interpretive debates in the investment context. See Ambiente Ufficio S.P.A. (formerly Alpi) v. Argentine
Republic, ICSID Case No. ARB/08/0, Decision on Jurisdiction and Admissibility dated Feb. 8, 2013,
¶¶75, 97, 126, available at http://www.italaw.com/sites/default/files/case-documents/italaw1276.pdf;
Abaclat (formerly Beccara) v. Argentine Republic, ICSID Case No. ARB/07/5, Decision on Jurisdiction
and Admissibility dated Aug. 4, 2011, ¶¶297, 517, available at
http://italaw.com/documents/AbaclatDecisiononJurisdiction.pdf [hereinafter Abaclat Award]; Abaclat
(formerly Beccara) v. Argentine Republic, ICSID Case No. ARB/07/5, Decision on Jurisdiction and
Admissibility, Dissenting Opinion dated Oct. 28, 2011, ¶¶154-75, available at
http://italaw.com/documents/Abaclat_Dissenting_Opinion.pdf [hereinafter Abaclat Dissent]; S.I. Strong,
Mass Procedures in Abaclat v. Argentine Republic: Are They Consistent With the International
Investment Regime?, 3 Y.B. INT’L ARB. 261 (2013); Strong, Regulatory Arbitration, supra, at 316-21.
365
A full-fledged analysis of each of the various treaties and arbitral rules is beyond the scope of the
current Article, so the current discussion is necessarily general in nature. See Alvarez, supra note 212, at
17; Born, Adjudication, supra note 23, at 844; Paulsson, supra note 212, at 236.
362

75

principles of arbitration law.366 Interestingly, the U.S. Supreme Court has recently suggested
that “rules requiring judicially monitored discovery” would likely violate “[t]he overarching
purpose of the FAA.”367 Although domestic law typically plays a very limited role in the
interpretation of treaties368 and most investment arbitrations do not fall within the scope of the
FAA,369 U.S. courts could easily conclude that judicially monitored discovery is as inappropriate
in the context of international investment arbitration as in cases falling under the FAA.370
Courts considering Section 1782 requests in the context of investment arbitration might
also find some useful analogies in the law relating to foreign sovereign immunity.371 For
example, courts in the United States have often limited certain types of discovery against foreign
sovereigns on the basis that discovery is inherently burdensome and intrusive, and that such
procedures are therefore improper in light of the special status accorded to foreign sovereigns.372
Requests under Section 1782 could be viewed in a similar light, in that the primary injury in
Section 1782 actions occurs not as a result of the use of the information in the investment
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See 28 U.S.C. §1782.
AT&T Mobility LLC v. Concepcion, 131 S. Ct. 1740, 1748 (2011); see also 9 U.S.C. §§1-16 (2013).
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See MCLACHLAN ET AL., supra note 7, ¶¶3.34, 3.79 (noting that the role of domestic law in treaty
interpretation is largely limited to “defining the scope of the investment protected”).
369
See 9 U.S.C. §§1-16. Some investment awards are enforceable under the New York Convention and
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tensions exist. See New York Convention, supra note 48; 9 U.S.C. §201; Republic of Argentina v. BG
Group, PLC, 665 F.3d 1363, 1368 (D.C. Cir. 2012), pet. for cert. filed, 81 U.S.L.W. 3070 (Jul. 27, 2012);
Republic of Ecuador v. Chevron Corp., 638 F.3d 384, 391-92 (2d Cir. 2011); Guillermo Aguilar Alvarez
& William W. Park, The New Face of Investment Arbitration: NAFTA Chapter 11, 28 YALE J. INT’L L.
365, 374 n.40 (2003); David A. Gantz, An Appellate Mechanism for Review of Arbitral Decisions in
Investor-State Disputes: Prospects and Challenges, 39 VAND. J. TRANSNAT’L L. 39, 57-58 (2006); see
also supra note 225 and accompanying text (noting some investment awards may be enforced under the
New York Convention).
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See 9 U.S.C. §§1-307.
371
See 28 U.S.C. §§1602-11 (2013); 28 U.S.C. §1782.
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See Hansen v. PT Bank Negara Indonesia (Persero), TBK, 601 F.3d 1059, 1063 (10th Cir. 2010);
Lantheus Medical Imaging, Inc. v. Zurich Am. Ins. Co., 841 F. Supp. 2d 769, 779 (S.D.N.Y. 2012); S.I.
Strong, Jurisdictional Discovery in Transnational Litigation: Extraterritorial Effects of United States
Federal Practice, 7 J. PRIV. INT’L L. 1, 15-16 (2011) [hereinafter Strong, Jurisdictional Discovery].
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arbitration itself (indeed, tribunals can simply refuse to receive such information) but as a result
of the discovery process itself.373
Although no Section 1782 request has yet been targeted at a foreign state, state agency or
instrumentality,374 the analogy to the law relating to foreign sovereigns is appropriate because
requests under Section 1782 necessarily implicate the rights and expectations of states parties to
an investment treaty.375 Since discovery under Section 1782 is both exceptional376 and extremely
burdensome,377 U.S. courts could very easily find discovery under Section 1782 to be as
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held by foreign state or state party within the United States, such a possibility exists. See Lantheus Med.
Imaging, Inc. v. Zurich Am. Ins. Co., 841 F. Supp. 2d 769, 776, 782-83, 796-97 (S.D.N.Y. 2012).
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Cent. Intelligence Agency, 229 F.3d 272, 276-77 (D.C. Cir. 2000); McKevitt v. Mueller, 689 F. Supp. 2d
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against a Section 1782 request. See 28 U.S.C. §1782; Republic of Argentina v. Weltover, Inc., 504 U.S.
607, 619 (1992); Frontera Resources Azerbaijan Corp. v. State Oil Co. of Azerbaijn Republic, 582 F.3d
393, 339-401 (2d Cir. 2009); Strong, Constitutional Conundrums, supra note 169. At this point, foreign
states are entitled to make a request under Section 1782. See In re Ecuador, No. C-10-80225 MISC CRB
(EMC), 2010 WL 4973492, at *3-6 (N.D. Cal. Dec. 1, 2010).
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See 28 U.S.C. §1782.
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See LEW ET AL., supra note 22, ¶¶22-49 to 22-52 (discussing disclosure or discovery in international
commercial arbitration); Alford, supra note 3, at 140-41 (noting a Section 1782 request may include (1)
requests for evidence that would not admissible in the foreign or international tribunal; (2) requests for
evidence from parties who are not named in the foreign or international proceeding (i.e., third parties),
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proceeding). Although England allows judicial assistance to be given to a foreign arbitral proceeding,
that mechanism is only available with the consent of the tribunal or of all parties to the dispute. See
Arbitration Act 1996, §§43-44; LEW ET AL., supra note 22, ¶¶22-95 to 22-106. Furthermore, disclosure
in the English legal system is much narrower than in the U.S. legal system. See LEW ET AL., supra note
22, ¶22-49; Strong, Jurisdictional Discovery, supra note 372, at 2.
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For example, one Section 1782 request generated over 200,000 pages of documents and an eight-day
deposition. See Alford, supra note 3, at 146; see also In re Chevron Corp., No. 11-24599, 2012 WL
3636925, at *2, 4-5 (S.D. Fla. June 12, 2012) (referring to “mounds of evidence” produced pursuant to
multiple Section 1782 requests); In re Veiga, 746 F. Supp. 2d 8, 16 (D.D.C.), appeal dismissed 2010 WL
5140467 (D.C. Cir. Dec. 17, 2010), appeal dismissed, 2011 WL 1765213 (D.C. Cir. Apr. 18, 2011).
Similarly broad requests have been made in other Section 1782 disputes. See In re Consorcio Ecuatoriano
de Telecomunicaciones S.A., 685 F.3d 987, 992 (11th Cir. 2012); Four Pillars Ents. Co. v. Avery
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problematic in matters relating to investment arbitration as standard discovery is in litigation
involving foreign sovereigns.378
Another way of considering U.S. state interests in investment arbitration is to focus on
whether the United States is a party to the instrument in question. The purpose of an investment
treaty is to create a set of rules and regulations relating to the treatment of investors from one
jurisdiction (the home country) in a second jurisdiction (the host country).379 As a result, these
agreements only concern the relationship between the states parties and their nationals.380
Consequently, it is difficult, if not impossible, for the United States to assert any treaty-based
justification for involving itself in an arbitration arising out of a treaty that the United States did
not sign, since neither the United States nor any U.S. parties are at risk of losing any substantive
or procedural rights as a result of an arbitration arising out of that treaty.
This is not to say that some creative arguments could not be raised. For example, the
United States could attempt to claim a general interest in the overall functioning of the
international investment regime, based on a concern about various procedural asymmetries
inherent in investment arbitration.381 However, many people would find it deeply disturbing if

1984); In re Mesa Power Group, LLC, No. 2:11-mc-280-ES, 2012 WL 6060941, at *8-9 (D.N.J. Nov. 20,
2012).
378
In enacting the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act (FSIA), Congress had two goals: “to reduce the
interference with the conduct of foreign relations caused by litigation in United States courts against
foreign sovereigns and to delegate foreign sovereign immunity decisions to the judicial branch.” Michael
A. Granne, Defining “Organ of a Foreign State” Under the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act of 1976,
42 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 1, 5 (2008); see also 28 U.S.C. §§1602-11 (2013). It is not inconceivable that
excessive use of Section 1782 in cases involving investment arbitration could create difficulties in foreign
relations, since U.S.-style discovery can be used to expand the scope of certain regulations. See Paul B.
Stephan, Privatizing International Law, 97 VA. L. REV. 1573, 1622 (2011); STRONG, CLASS, supra note
262, ¶¶5.76, 6.33.
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See MCLACHLAN ET AL., supra note 7, ¶1.57; Salacuse, supra note 204, at 434-35, 449-50.
380
See MCLACHLAN ET AL., supra note 7, ¶5.01.
381
See Thomas Wälde, Procedural Challenges in Investment Arbitration under the Shadow of the Dual
Role of the State: Asymmetries and Tribunals’ Duty to Ensure, Pro-actively, the Equality of Arms, 26
ARB. INT’L 3, 11-39 (2010) (suggesting that host states have both the ability and the incentive to make it
difficult for investors to prevail in international arbitration).
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the one country whose procedural mechanisms are most out of line with contemporary legal
practice were able to impose those procedures unilaterally on a proceeding in which the state had
no treaty-based interest under the guise of supporting the international treaty regime.382 This
outcome is particularly problematic given that there is no consensus as to whether a singular
“investment regime” actually exists and what its practices and purposes might be.383 As a result,
it does not appear as if the United States can claim any protectable state interest in providing
discovery under Section 1782 to an investment arbitration proceeding under a treaty not
involving the United States.384
Treaties involving the United States require a slightly different analysis, since the
arbitration in question could involve either the United States or a U.S. party. Even in those cases
where neither the United States nor a U.S. party is involved, the United States might nevertheless
be entitled to assert an interest in the procedure or outcome of a dispute arising under a
multilateral treaty.385
The problem with this argument is that regardless of how the United States frames its
arguments, state interests are only protectable to the extent they are reflected in the treaty.386

See Alford, supra note 3, at 139 (noting the “horror” with which other countries view U.S.-style
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376 and accompanying text.
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See Mills, supra note 364, at 501-02; Strong, Regulatory Arbitration, supra note 364, at 300-03; van
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See 28 U.S.C. §1782 (2013).
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party. See Gabrielle Kaufmann-Kohler, Arbitral Precedent: Dream, Necessity or Excuse? 23 ARB. INT’L
357, 361-78 (2007).
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Convention, supra note 334, art. 31(3) (focusing on the parties’ shared understandings); see also Evan
Criddle, The Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties in U.S. Treaty Interpretation, 44 VA. J. INT’L L.
431, 435, 461-63 (2004); David S. Jonas & Thomas N. Saunders, The Object and Purpose of a Treaty:
Three Interpretive Methods, 43 VAND. J. TRANSNAT’L L. 565, 581 (2010); Daniella Strik, Investment
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While it is true that some authorities take the view that any rights or interests not specifically
described in a treaty remain with the state (a perspective that would support the United States’
belief that procedures under Section 1782 are unaffected by investment treaties), that approach is
by no means universally accepted.387 Furthermore, most investment treaties explicitly
incorporate certain arbitration rules into the treaty by reference, thereby incorporating various
longstanding principles about the propriety of judicial intervention in arbitration into the
investment context.388 As the next subsection shows, these principles bode against the
conclusion that the United States has retained any state interest in judicially mandated discovery
under Section 1782.389

2.

International commercial arbitration

The discussion of Section 1782 requests in the context of international commercial arbitration
begins with a disclaimer.390 Some authorities have attempted to distinguish state interests in
investment arbitration from those in international commercial arbitration on the basis of the
underlying substantive law, claiming that the state interest in investment arbitration is or should
be more pronounced because investment disputes involve important issues of public or

Protection of Sovereign Debt and its Implications on the Future of Investment Law in the EU, 29 J. INT’L
ARB. 183, 189-90 (2012). Subsequent state practice that is inconsistent with the treaty cannot provide
grounds for a new understanding of an international agreement. See ANTHONY AUST, MODERN TREATY
LAW AND PRACTICE 194 (2000); IAN MCTAGGART SINCLAIR, THE VIENNA CONVENTION ON THE LAW OF
TREATIES 138 (2d ed. 1984).
387
See 28 U.S.C. §1782; Ibironke T. Odumosu, The Law and Politics of Engaging Resistance in
Investment Dispute Settlement, 26 PENN. ST. INT’L L. REV. 251, 272 (2007); Jason Webb Yackee,
Controlling the International Investment Law Agency, 53 HARV. INT’L L. J. 391, 399 (2012).
388
The arbitration rules most commonly used in investment arbitration were either created initially for use
in commercial arbitration or were based on principles developed in commercial arbitration. See Born,
Adjudication, supra note 23, at 781, 834-35; see also infra notes 72-73 and accompanying text.
389
See 28 U.S.C. §1782.
390
See id.
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regulatory law.391 While investment arbitration does indeed concentrate on these types of
concerns, international commercial arbitration is also capable of addressing matters of a public or
regulatory nature.392 Furthermore, national courts (which are undoubtedly included in the
definition of a “foreign or international tribunal” under Section 1782) have long been considered
capable of handling public and regulatory concerns as well as matters relating to international
law.393 As a result, the nature of the underlying dispute as involving public, regulatory and/or
international law appears irrelevant to the question of whether discovery under Section 1782 is
appropriate.394
Procedural concerns give rise to a somewhat more complicated analysis. As it turns out,
international commercial and investment arbitration share numerous procedural similarities.395
This phenomenon is no accident. Instead, states parties intentionally adopted the procedural
model developed by international commercial arbitration when they created the international
investment regime.396 Many of the rule sets used in the investment context continue to be
available for use in commercial proceedings.397
When considering state interests in arbitral procedures, the initial presumption is that
existing procedures are sufficient to meet any concerns about the full and fair adjudication of
legal disputes, at least as a general matter (individual circumstances may, of course, lead to
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different conclusions).398 This conclusion is as true of investment arbitration as it is of
international commercial proceedings.399
Arbitration does not need to offer all of the procedural protections that are available in
litigation for the arbitral process to be considered fair.400 Instead, arbitration only needs to
provide certain basic principles of due process, such as reasonable notice, equal treatment and
the opportunity to present one’s case.401 These concepts, which are outlined in Article V of the
New York Convention, can be considered to describe the content of the state interest in
international arbitral procedures, since the principles are non-derogable.402
Parties attempting to establish a state interest in discovery under Section 1782 will most
likely rely on Article V(1)(b) of the New York Convention, which states that a court may refuse
enforcement of an arbitral award if “[t]he party against whom the award is invoked was . . .
unable to present his case.”403 The claim here is similar to that considered in the context of the
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VAND. L. REV. 1189, 1196 (2008).
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See New York Convention, supra note 48, art. V; WILLIAM W. PARK, ARBITRATION OF
INTERNATIONAL BUSINESS DISPUTES 7 (2012); Kaufmann-Kohler, Globalization, supra note 302, at
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discussion on grants of jurisdiction, namely that some parties might not be able to establish
certain claims or defenses without the benefit of discovery under Section 1782.404 As indicated
previously, parties seeking to rely on Article V(1)(b) must overcome the fact that arbitration has
long been determined to be sufficient to meet the standards established by the New York
Convention, even without the kind of discovery provided by Section 1782.405
The state interest analysis is not restricted to issues relating to procedural fairness
alone.406 Instead, the New York Convention reflects several other state interests, such as an
interest in protecting party autonomy regarding the shape of arbitral procedure407 or an interest in
having courts remain largely outside the arbitral process pursuant to the principle of judicial noninterference.408 Interestingly, this latter interest can be described as both an independent state
interest as well as a derivative interest held by the parties pursuant to their right to control the
arbitral procedure.409

THE 1958 NEW YORK CONVENTION

12 (2011) [hereinafter ICCA GUIDE]; Strong, Interpretation, supra
note 243.
404
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999 (2009) [hereinafter Born, Non-Interference]; Smit, Judicial Assistance, supra note 18, at 157. Courts
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Although there is no language in the New York Convention explicitly describing the
concept of judicial non-interference (indeed, the text of the Convention appears to focus
primarily on the positive duty to enforce arbitration agreements and awards), the treaty has long
been interpreted as including a negative duty not to litigate matters that are subject to an
arbitration agreement.410 This obligation, which is described in mandatory terms and directed
specifically at the courts of the various states parties,411 is found in Article II(3) of the
Convention, which indicates that
[t]he court of a Contracting State, when seized of an action in a matter in respect
of which the parties have made an agreement within the meaning of this article,
shall, at the request of one of the parties, refer the parties to arbitration, unless it
finds that the said agreement is null and void, inoperative or incapable of being
performed.412
Most analysis of this provision has taken place in the context of merits-based disputes.
However, the negative effect of Article II(3) can also be considered with respect to various
procedures that do not reach the substance of the parties’ dispute.413 Perhaps the most useful
analogy for Section 1782 analyses involves the anti-suit injunction, another type of non-meritsbased proceeding that is considered problematic under the New York Convention.414 At this
point, no consensus exists regarding whether and to what extent anti-suit injunctions should be
involving party autonomy and contract-related rights. See Born, Non-Interference, supra note 308, at
1026-33; Richard C. Reuben, Personal Autonomy and Vacatur After Hall Street, 113 PENN. ST. L. REV.
1103, 1127-28 (2009).
410
See BORN, supra note 29, at 1003, 1021; Born, Non-Interference, supra note 308, at 1026-27; see also
New York Convention, supra note 48, arts. II(1), II(3). Interestingly, some commentators view the
negative duty not to litigate arbitral matters as clearer under the New York Convention than the positive
duty to arbitrate an arbitral dispute. See BORN, supra note 29, at 1014.
411
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is self-executing. See New York Convention, supra note 48, art. II(3); Safety Nat’l Cas. Corp. v. Certain
Underwriters at Lloyd’s, London, 587 F.3d 714, 736-37 (5th Cir. 2009) (Clement, J., concurring in the
judgment), cert. denied sub nom. La. Safety Ass’n of Timbermen-Self Insurers Fund v. Certain
Underwriters at Lloyd’s London, 131 S. Ct. 65 (2010); Strong, Interpretation, supra note 243.
412
New York Convention, supra note 48, art. II(3); BORN, supra note 29, at 1021. This negative duty is
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414
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available in international commercial arbitration.415 However, some commentators have
suggested that anti-suit injunctions are only appropriate in cases where the injunction upholds the
purpose of arbitration and thereby gives effect to the agreement of the parties.416 Under this
approach, an anti-suit injunction might be considered acceptable during or prior to an arbitration,
since such measures would typically protect the single arbitral forum contemplated by the New
York Convention.417 However, an anti-suit injunction would be considered far less suitable after
the conclusion of the arbitration, since the New York Convention permits parties to pursue
enforcement in multiple jurisdictions during that time period.418
These conclusions are based on the view that joining the New York Convention causes
states parties to cede any interest they might otherwise have had in domestic judicial procedures
that conflict with the terms of the treaty.419 Applying this analytical paradigm to requests under
Section 1782 suggests that a U.S. court may only order discovery under the statute if those

415
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Antisuit Injunctions, 35 TUL. MAR. L.J. 401, 441-64 (2011); Emmanuel Gaillard, Anti-Suit Injunctions
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efforts uphold the purposes of the New York Convention.420 If Section 1782 does not comport
with the principles and practices of international commercial arbitration, then the mere act of
hearing a request for discovery under the statute would constitute a breach of the court’s negative
duty under the Convention to refer all arbitrable matters to arbitration.421
As a general matter, states that have opted into the international commercial arbitration
regime created by the New York Convention are viewed as having surrendered virtually any
interest they might otherwise have in the particularities of their national procedural law and to
have instead acceded to international commercial arbitration’s unique blend of common and civil
law procedures.422 Thus, U.S. courts have explicitly recognized that “the right to due process
protected by the New York Convention does not encompass the procedural rights guaranteed by
the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure,” including the right to discovery.423
Arbitration overcomes any practical problems associated with the absence of compelled
disclosure through the adoption of various procedural techniques (such as negative inferences
and shifting the burden of proof) that are routinely used by judges sitting in civil law
jurisdictions.424 As a result, the international arbitral regime consciously forgoes the common
law approach to the production of documents and information (which focuses on “[w]hat
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evidence should be heard to understand the whole case”) and instead adopts the philosophy
reflected in civil law jurisdictions (which asks “[w]hat evidence is required to reach a justifiable
decision”).425
Focusing on state interests is useful because it forces courts to consider U.S. obligations
under the New York Convention and thereby puts Section 1782 in its proper light.426 If a
particular practice falls outside the range of protectable procedures, then need alone cannot be
sufficient to elevate that device to protected status.427 Thus, for example, if a party claims that
discovery under Section 1782 is necessary because “non-parties are usually outside the forum
courts’ jurisdiction, and are not susceptible to pressure that arbitrators can apply to parties, such
as negative inferences for failing to provide evidence,”428 the relevant analysis should not focus
on the need for such information per se429 but instead on whether the United States has retained
an interest in providing the underlying procedural device under the New York Convention.430
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One argument that could be asserted in favor of a retained state interest in Section 1782
procedures arises out of Article V(2)(b) of the New York Convention, which allows a national
court to refuse recognition and enforcement of an arbitral award on the grounds of public
policy.431 Although this argument would be contrary to longstanding case law indicating that the
United States has not retained an interest in domestic discovery procedures in situations
involving international commercial arbitration,432 there have been instances where a state has
elevated a procedural concern to the level of public policy.433
As appealing as this argument may initially appear, objections based on public policy are
narrowly interpreted in international commercial arbitration, and “only violations of the
enforcement state’s public policy with respect to international relations (international public
policy or ordre public international) [are] a valid defense” to enforcement.434 International
public policy includes concerns about “biased arbitrators, lack of reasons in the award, serious
irregularities in the arbitration procedure, allegations of illegality, corruption or fraud, the award
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of punitive damages and the breach of competition law” and therefore does not appear to
encompass the kinds of issues raised by Section 1782.435
Other problems also exist with respect to any kind of public policy argument. For
example, Section 1782 is a highly exceptional procedure that does not give rise to the type of
shared consensus that is necessary to make a particular procedure eligible for consideration as an
international public policy.436 Furthermore, policy considerations only come into play at the
time of enforcement, not at any intermediate stage, as would likely be the case with most Section
1782 proceedings.437 Thus, Article V(2)(b) of the New York Convention does not appear
sufficient to support an argument that the United States has retained a defensible state interest in
discovery under Section 1782.438

C.

Interpretive Canons

The preceding discussion demonstrates how difficult it can be to conceptualize the interaction
between domestic and international law.439 However, this type of analytical problem is not in
any way unique to arbitration. U.S. courts have long had to consider the interplay between
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national and international law and have in fact developed a number of interpretive canons to help
rationalize judicial determinations in this regard.440
One of the best known means of resolving potential conflicts between international and
domestic law is the Charming Betsy canon, which states that ambiguous domestic statutes “ought
never to be construed to violate the law of nations if any other possible construction remains.”441
Because Section 1782 is ambiguous as to its applicability to both international commercial and
investment arbitration, courts can and should consider using the Charming Betsy canon to
resolve interpretive difficulties.442
Courts seeking to rely on the Charming Betsy canon must first identify the content of the
international law at issue and then determine whether and to what extent a conflict exists with
domestic law.443 If a particular interpretation of a domestic statute would lead to a violation of
international law, then the Charming Betsy canon should be applied to avoid that particular
outcome.444 Given the various difficulties that arise when the term “foreign or international
tribunal” is interpreted as including tribunals sitting in either international commercial or
investment arbitration, it would appear appropriate for U.S. courts to apply the Charming Betsy
canon to exclude arbitral tribunals from Section 1782’s statutory scope so as to avoid creating a
440
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situation where the United States is in breach of its obligations under the New York Convention
or another treaty.445
Another interpretive canon that is often used in cases involving a conflict between a
federal statute and an international treaty is the last-in-time rule.446 Under this approach, courts
apply whichever of the two provisions – the statute or the treaty – that was enacted more
recently.447 Although this canon also requires a court to recognize the existence of a conflict
between domestic and international law, that prerequisite appears to be met in cases involving
Section 1782 requests in the context of both investment arbitration and international commercial
arbitration.448
Application of the last in time rule would appear to require denial of Section 1782
requests in the context of international commercial and investment arbitration, since Section
1782 was enacted in its current form in 1964, well in advance of U.S. accession to most, if not
all, of the relevant treaties in this field.449 For example, the United States ratified the ICSID
Convention in 1966, the New York Convention in 1970 and most bilateral investment treaties in
the 1980s and 1990s.450 Although some argument could be made that courts should consider
2004 (the year that Intel was decided) to be the start date for entry into force of the expanded
445
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reading of Section 1782, the last in time rule does not consider judicial glosses on statutes but
instead focuses on the date on which the legislation itself was enacted.451
The third and final interpretive canon to consider involves construing Section 1782 in
pari materia.452 At least one commentator has suggested that “in U.S. federal legislation
currently in force, whether enacted before or after the 1964 amendments to §1782, ‘tribunal’
without elaboration means a U.S. government body, a ‘foreign’ tribunal is governmental, and an
‘international tribunal’ is inter-governmental.”453 This observation again leads to difficulties for
proponents of Section 1782 in the context of international commercial or investment arbitration,
since none of those terms appear to apply to arbitral tribunals sitting in either scenario.454

IV.

Conclusion

As the preceding discussion has shown, Section 1782 requests create numerous problems in the
context of international commercial and investment arbitration.455 For example, “the
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Americanization456 of international arbitration . . . through Section 1782 discovery could threaten
to undermine many of the perceived advantages” of both types of proceedings.457 Alternatively,
use of Section 1782 in either international commercial or investment arbitration could result in a
violation of international law.458
Most of difficulties arise as a result of ambiguity in the term “foreign or international
tribunal,” which has led some commentators to suggest use of an explicit prohibition on Section
1782 so as to avoid any sort of interpretive issues.459 While such measures are technically
possible, that approach would require parties from all over the world to exclude application of
Section 1782 even in cases where there is no apparent or immediate connection to the United
States.460 That sort of default rule gives rise to numerous practical and conceptual problems,
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suggesting the need for a better and more effective means of addressing the ambiguities inherent
in Section 1782.461
This Article has considered issues relating to definition of the term “foreign or
international tribunal” from several different perspectives, including grants of jurisdiction, state
interests and interpretive cannons. Interestingly, each of the three methodologies suggests that
Section 1782 is improper in the case of both international commercial and investment
arbitration.462
On one level, these conclusions are somewhat surprising, since emerging case law and
commentary has suggested that a distinction could be developing between the two types of
arbitration, with Section 1782 requests appearing to be more likely to be granted in cases
involving investment arbitration.463 On another level, however, the findings are not entirely
unexpected, since much of the case law relating to the interaction between Section 1782 and
arbitration has come out of the Chevron-Ecuador dispute, a notoriously difficult and novel matter
on both the facts and the law.464
Although Section 1782 requests in the context of international commercial and
investment arbitration have increased significantly over the last few years, the case law and
commentary are nowhere near developed enough to foreclose new avenues of analysis.465 It is
critical that U.S. courts get this issue right, since requests under Section 1782 have the potential
to affect both international commerce and international perception of the United States as a
world actor.466 Therefore, it is hoped that this Article will prove useful to judicial and scholarly
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authorities as they consider the ramifications of Section 1782 requests in international
commercial and investment arbitration in the coming years.467
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